

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER 1962

COMMUNIST CHINA, 1962

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CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1962

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How stable is the Communist government of mainland China? How strong is the Chinese Communist voice in world affairs? Here seven articles evaluate the People's Republic of China. Of her role in the Communist bloc, our first author notes that "Peking at the moment, within the context of Marxian formulations, happens to represent the extreme Left, where Yugoslavia, 'poly-centrists' and Revisionists represent the Right and Moscow the moderating center. . . . But more important than these postures per se is the fact that Peking represents an alternate leadership in the Communist world."

China's Role in the Communist Bloc

By CHARLES B. McLANE

Chairman of the Department of Russian Civilization, Dartmouth College

STUDENTS of China have recently been impelled by the impasse in Sino-Soviet relations to make fresh appraisals of the Chinese Revolution. But they continue to be tantalized and mystified by its essential nature. Is it, *au fond*, a national revolution, restoring unity to China, differing from Sun Yat-sen's (and even Chiang Kai-shek's) chiefly in the different strategies Mao has used and the success he has achieved? Is it a monolithic protest by hundreds of millions, adroitly led, against chronic misrule and maladministration? Or is it, after all, another in a series of Twentieth Century Marxian revolutions, inspired by Bolshevism and largely sustained—despite present appearances—by Russians? Clearly this does not exhaust the range of possible interpretations of what has been transpiring in China during the past dozen years.

Whatever judgment is reached, the Chinese Revolution as of this writing seems to belong to Asia, not Europe, despite its acknowledged debt to European Marxism. And

if it is Asian, and if this imparts a distinctive character to Communist China today, can Peking exist harmoniously within a Communist bloc that is traditionally European and is still dominated by European Russians? The Chinese leadership, unlike most leaderships in Eastern Europe, does not need Moscow to sustain itself. Nor are Russians necessary for the defense of China—for who would attack? History, surely, does not show any advantage in China's looking to Russia. And, in Peking's mind, even China's economic development does not depend beyond a few years on Soviet bounty. It must then be ideology which impels China toward Russia. The question comes down to this: is ideology a sufficient force to keep China allied with Russia in the Communist bloc against considerations that might tend to make Peking indifferent or even hostile to such an alliance?

The present article addresses itself to this question, but without promising any answer. Moreover since the accent in many recent and excellent studies of this problem has been on

the Sino-Soviet relationship *per se*, the focus of this article will be rather on China and the Communist community as a whole.¹

CHINESE COMMUNISM BEFORE 1949

At the outset of the Communist movement in China its leaders were too inexperienced and Soviet prestige too formidable for the fledgling Chinese to play any independent role in world communism. They were the objects, not the authors, of revolutionary strategy. Their policies were given to them ready-made in Moscow and were never rejected and rarely ever challenged. For nearly a decade the Chinese were among the most subservient members of the world movement. Their delegates to Comintern Congresses and sessions of the Executive Committee were unremarkable. No Chinese Communist of the stature, say, of M. N. Roy of India ventured to debate Lenin's "Theses on the Colonial and National Question" or to question the Comintern leadership after Lenin died.

The debacle of Stalin's Chinese policy at the end of the 1920's altered the prospects for the Chinese Communists. The Comintern continued for several years to dominate the Party organization in the cities, but the emergence of a "soviet" apparatus led by Mao Tse-tung in South China gave a new dimension to the Chinese movement. Moscow's inability to give effective guidance to this

soviet organization, because of its isolation, and the Russian decision after 1930 to refrain from direct interference in China's domestic affairs meant that Mao's movement gained a *de facto* independence from Moscow.

By the mid-1930's all that was left of the Communist organization laboriously constructed by Comintern agents during the preceding decade and a half was under Mao's control. Meanwhile, the manner in which Stalin had summarily dismissed earlier Chinese Communist leaders such as Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san, charging them with errors that were more properly laid to Stalin himself, had left its mark on Chinese views of the value of the association with Moscow. There is, to be sure, extremely little evidence during these years of outright antagonism between Mao and Moscow—and, of course, there could be no such rivalry as we detect today—but relations were decidedly distant and cool.

It was during the years after the collapse, in 1927, of the first united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists that the latter began to contact other Asian revolutionary movements. In Singapore, for instance, Chinese Communist agents organized in 1928 a South Seas Communist party designed to direct the activities of nascent movements in Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand and Indochina.² In 1934, the Chinese Communists addressed an open letter to the Indochinese Communists urging them to form soviets similar to those in South China.³ In the Philippines the Chinese soviets were regarded as the prototype of future Communist organization there.⁴

The Chinese Communists, however, were unable to offer tangible assistance to Philippine, Indochinese or other Asian revolutionary movements after 1931 because of their growing isolation in the face of Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit-extermination" campaigns, both before and after the Long March. With the establishment of a new united front with the Kuomintang in 1937 the opportunities for contact with other Asians were improved, but by then revolutionary programs were no longer appropriate. The Chinese soviets were

¹ Among the more noteworthy recent studies of Sino-Soviet relations are: Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton, 1962); Kurt London (ed.), *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (Praeger, 1962); and G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Praeger, 1961). To this list should be added articles by these and other writers in such journals as *China Quarterly*, *Survey* and *Problems of Communism*.

² Documents recently inspected by the writer in Kuala Lumpur indicate that this organization lasted until 1930 when, at Comintern insistence, it was replaced by separate Communist parties for each country (where conditions permitted); the new parties were to be responsible to the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai rather than to the Chinese Communists.

³ *Materialy po natsional'no-kolonial'nym problemam*, No. 9, pp. 67-81.

⁴ See the 1935 manifesto of the Communist party of the Philippines in *Communist* (New York), April, 1935, p. 375.

dissolved and all efforts were directed against the Japanese. The only significant influence the Chinese Communists were able to exercise on other Asian movements during the Sino-Japanese war was through the few foreign Communists—such as Nozaka of Japan—who found refuge in Yen-an. A Chinese Communist faction collaborated for a time with the Hukbalahap movement in the Philippines early in the war, but evidently left little impression on the Filipino leadership.⁵

After the war the efforts of the Chinese Communists were too fully engaged in their final struggle for power to allow time for any effective exercise of influence among the revolutionary movements now blossoming throughout East Asia. Only in Malaya, where the Communist movement was predominantly Chinese, is there evidence that active contacts were established.⁶ But the inspiration given to the national-revolutionary movements in Asia by Mao's successes should not be overlooked. The Vietminh, for instance, was greatly stimulated in its struggle against the French by these successes. The mood of a critical conference of Southeast Asian youth leaders held under Communist auspices in Calcutta in February, 1948, was largely shaped by impending victory in China. And the uprisings in Burma, Malaya and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia which followed this conference drew their inspiration in large measure from the victorious Chinese Communists.

In Asia, then, up to 1949, the impact of Chinese communism, except perhaps in Malaya, was more symbolic than tangible. Asian revolutionaries were fully aware of Chinese

communism, especially after 1946 when civil war was resumed in China. But apart from the short-lived South Seas Communist party in Singapore in the 1920's, few Chinese Communists had made direct contact with other Asians. Mao's writings, except in Malaya, were still largely unknown throughout the continent. Blockade, isolation and the bitter struggle for survival had denied to the Chinese Communists an established base comparable to the Comintern's, from which, under normal conditions, they might have exercised more significant influence throughout Asia. In European communism, needless to say, the Chinese remained a wholly negligible factor.

COMMUNISM ESTABLISHED

The establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, through the efforts of the Chinese Communists themselves without substantial outside aid, greatly altered their capacity to exert influence in the world Communist movement. Now, for the first time, they possessed a secure base. During the first years of the new regime there continued to be little opportunity to influence Communist policies in Europe. This was due in the main to Stalin's firm intent to cast China in a satellite role—albeit on a plane somewhat higher than that of the Eastern European satellites in deference to China's size and, perhaps, to the independent manner of Mao's coming to power.

In Asia, however, the impact of Peking was felt immediately. In North Korea the entry of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean War meant, for several years, a substitution of Chinese influence for Russian. In Vietnam the assistance given by Peking to the Vietminh was directly responsible for the crucial victory at Dienbienphu and was perhaps sufficient to have assured a full rout of the French throughout the country were it not for the truce negotiated at Geneva in July, 1954, in accordance with new policies originating in Moscow.⁷ Elsewhere in Southeast Asia the Chinese Communists urged on local national and revolutionary movements their successful course of armed struggle against imperialism.

⁵ Two former Huk leaders whom the author interviewed in January, 1962—Luis Taruc and Jose Lava—stated that this faction withdrew to the southern islands in 1943 and played no further part in the Huk movement.

⁶ The M.C.P. leader Chen Peng, for instance, went twice to China between 1945 and 1948 to consult with Chinese Communist agents, according to reliable Malayan documents.

⁷ The part played by Chinese aid in Ho Chi Minh's victory, which has been occasionally alluded to even in Chinese and Soviet sources, was described to this writer in some detail by a former Vietminh colonel—now a provincial chief in South Vietnam—during an interview in February, 1962.

Wide circulation was given to concepts such as "protracted war" and "guerrilla warfare" derived from the Chinese experience. Simultaneously, Peking established relatively cordial diplomatic relations with a few "neutralist" countries in Asia, such as India and Burma, and exchanged representatives with a number of others.

Stalin's death removed an obstacle to Peking's assumption of a still larger role in world Communist strategies. The new Soviet leadership, which sat insecurely at first, acted promptly to improve relations with China. Soviet financial aid was greatly increased in 1953, in connection with China's first Five Year Plan. Following the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Peking in 1954, the various Soviet leaseholds and concessions in Manchuria were returned, new instruments were fashioned for implementing the alliance and—perhaps most important of all—it was agreed that the two leaderships would consult prior to any major moves in foreign affairs, or in matters affecting foreign affairs.

China accepted, for the nonce, the Soviet formulation on "peaceful co-existence," as shown in Chou En-lai's conciliatory behavior at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and in Peking's subscription to the principles of Pan Shila. Relations were normalized with additional nations both in Asia and Europe. During this same period (1953–1956) China also strengthened its relations with its Eastern European allies, greatly increasing trade with them until by 1956 more than 75 per cent of Peking's foreign trade was within the Communist bloc.

Still, China had not yet begun to play a vital part in world Communist affairs. The Chinese, for instance, had nothing to do with the Cominform which, though declining in prestige after Stalin's death, was the only overt international organization of Communists in existence. Not until 1958 was China involved in CEMA, the coordinating agency for the economies of the Communist bloc. Nor was Peking concerned, insofar as is known, with the "New Course" devised for Eastern Europe and designed to place Soviet-satellite relations on a more cordial footing.

China continued to play the part of a proper junior partner in the bloc—junior, it is true, only to the U.S.S.R.—and, in turn, was freely acknowledged by Moscow to be the model for revolution (or evolution) in colonial and underdeveloped countries. But for all this Peking stood somewhat outside the main stream of the world movement.

THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA

Peking might, in the natural order of things, have taken on such stature that its voice in bloc affairs would be heard as a matter of course. It was not acquired stature, however, that finally brought the Chinese forward, but specific differences with their Russian allies. In retrospect it can be seen that the seeds of the Sino-Soviet dispute (or "dialogue," as it is called in the jargon of the specialists), which persists to the present, were sown at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist party in 1956 when Khrushchev, for reasons still not wholly clear, launched his attack on Stalin. The Chinese, it may be imagined, had no special reverence for Stalin, at whose hands they had suffered numerous indignities in the past. But Khrushchev's unilateral assault violated the principle of consultation agreed to in 1954.

Perhaps in part because of this, Peking encouraged "National Communism" in Eastern Europe in the summer of 1956 and became for a few months the chief protector of the rights of the Eastern Europeans, especially the Poles, against Moscow. When in the autumn "National Communism" erupted in Poland in noisy manifestations against the Soviet Union and in Hungary in even noisier demonstrations against the Communist regime itself, Peking continued to defend diversity. This, however, was to be kept within certain clearly prescribed limits: the essential unity of the Communist commonwealth must not be jeopardized, especially in foreign affairs, and Moscow's leadership must be duly acknowledged by all the fraternal parties. The purpose of Chou En-lai's visit to Eastern Europe in January, 1957, was to drive this message home.

The apparent success of Chou's mission en-

couraged Mao to articulate in greater detail his ideas on the nature of the relationship between the Communist state and its subjects, as a sort of *post-mortem* on the Polish and especially Hungarian episodes. In February, Mao delivered an important address entitled "On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Among the People" (an amplification of his 1937 article "On Contradiction") in which he argued that certain "non-antagonistic contradictions" inevitably exist in Communist societies but need not be forcibly suppressed; they must instead be talked away, or at least neutralized, by carefully organized campaigns. The speech and the wide publicity given it in the following months—one outcome of the speech, for instance, was the famous "100 flowers" campaign in the spring of 1957—constituted the first serious effort of the Chinese Communists to enter the broad range of Marxian ideology on an international plane. Since Mao's ideas, though not new to Chinese communism, were entirely unlike any formulations approved by Moscow, his intervention amounted to a direct challenge of Russian authority in ideological matters.

Had the "100 flowers" campaign not boomeranged, by unleashing a rash of entirely unexpected criticism of Mao's regime, Peking might well have become the leader, rather than the principle opponent, of diversity, "polycentrism" and even Revisionism. The sharpness of the response to Mao's invitation to speak forth, however, led to a chain of developments within the Chinese leadership—developments which are still obscure⁸—that brought Peking, between June and November, 1957, from a position generally described as Rightist to an Orthodoxy *ne plus ultra*. At the conference of world Communist leaders in Moscow in November, 1957, following the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mao took an implacable stand against diversity within the bloc, as represented by

leaders like Gomulka (whom only a year before Peking had strongly supported). He insisted again that the Communist camp must have a leader and that this should be Moscow. And he pressed for a more aggressive assault on Western imperialism. When the Yugoslavs refused to sign the declaration summing up the deliberations, Peking led a new attack on Titoism.

Thus began China's gravitation to the extreme Left within the Communist bloc, a position held persistently from late 1957 to the present. Peking has denied Khrushchev's thesis of peaceful roads to communism, insisted that wars are inevitable as long as capitalism persists, and, in general, sought to obstruct Moscow's implementations of "peaceful coexistence." Developments within the bloc during these five crucial years, especially the episodes which chronicle the widening rift between China and Russia, are well enough known in outline to require no detailed treatment here.

The year 1960 witnessed a particular intensification of the "dialogue," expressed in numerous acid, if still veiled, exchanges between Peking and Moscow and in confrontations of Soviet and Chinese representatives at Party Congresses in Bucharest and Hanoi as well as in the Conference of the 81 Parties in Moscow in November. The latter conference, which met for nearly two months behind closed doors in a vain attempt to break the deadlock, yielded a resolution which most observers agreed was more remarkable for what it left unsaid than what it said.

In 1961, the dispute broke forth anew during the Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U. in October when Khrushchev preemptorily attacked China's ally, Albania, causing Chou En-lai to quit the Congress. During recent months there have been a few indications of a return to normalcy in intra-bloc relations, such as the signing of new trade agreements between China and other members of the bloc (including Russia), but most students of the matter feel that the rivalry is essentially undiminished.

Why has Peking behaved as it has?

Numerous explanations of Chinese intransi-

⁸ An interesting, if tentative, treatment of these developments is given in Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1958, pp. 323-335; this account is somewhat amplified in Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Chapter Two.

gence in recent years, other than Peking's disillusion in the liberal experiment with "100 flowers" and the intra-Party crisis following it, have been explored by students of China and widely publicized in the West. Most of these explanations, not surprisingly, relate to the Sino-Soviet dispute, since China's belligerence has been manifested largely in the context of this rivalry. But the reader should be cautioned that Peking's posture since 1957 is not *solely* determined by its relationship with Moscow, an aspect of the problem to which we will return.

REASONS FOR INTRANSIGENCE

One category of reasons offered for China's behavior relates to an especially virulent brand of nationalism emerging in Peking. Marx's dictum that national distinctions would yield to class distinctions applies in China no more than in other Communist states. As Chinese national consciousness is reborn, after many decades of desuetude, the greatness of China in past centuries is recalled. This leads Peking to seek the recovery of such lost areas as Formosa, which becomes a primary objective of Chinese foreign policy although remaining a matter of relative indifference to Moscow and the rest of the bloc. In other areas, such as Outer Mongolia, Peking's ambitions run directly counter to Moscow's own national interests and it is unlikely the two can ever be reconciled.

In still other frontier areas, such as the Indian-Tibetan border, China's objectives and the manner of gaining them embarrass Russia's carefully constructed relations with New Delhi thus further aggravating Sino-Soviet relations and weakening the bloc. Similarly, a detente with the West, which Moscow appears to consider in the best interests of world communism at the present stage, provides no advantage to Peking, until conditions are judged auspicious for a more normal role in world affairs. This even increases China's isolation. Accordingly, Peking tries

systematically to impede a serious detente and in the attempt exacerbates friction within the bloc.

Another category of reasons for Peking's behavior concerns ideology, where perhaps the most voluminous evidence of Chinese intransigence and of the "dialogue" may be found. The Peking leadership, unlike Moscow's, is still composed largely of Communists who spent the greater part of their lives struggling for power and for an ideal; they were weaned in revolution. This inevitably gives a more strident tone to their pronouncements than one would expect to hear from second, even third, generation Bolsheviks. The claim, for instance, that the famous "communes" represented a vehicle for a direct transition to communism reflected the exuberance and idealism of a young and still unseasoned revolution.

In his advice to struggling Asian and African revolutionaries, Mao, raising strategy to the dignity of ideology, accents precisely those strategies that brought his own regime into being and which constitute the "lessons of the Chinese Revolution": armed struggle, guerrilla warfare and, above all, aloofness from crippling coalitions with the bourgeoisie.

In many of these new formulations Peking clashes head-on with Moscow and so adds more fuel to the fire. But Peking is no wilful destroyer of the Communist bloc. On the contrary, Mao is one of the most persistent adherents of Communist unity and still acknowledges Moscow's preeminence within the bloc, although with more reservations than formerly. The Russians, however, must return to Marxist fundamentals; Mao has assumed the role of proper custodian of the ideology and means to compel orthodoxy on his wayward allies or force them to abdicate. In this sense, of course, he is a direct descendant of Lenin who told a rival faction of Russian Marxists in 1902 that if they must propagate heresies they should do so "in the marsh" and not deter the faithful from their true course.⁹

Nationalism and the search for ideological conformity combine to create another category of reasons for China's recent actions,

⁹ The passage occurs in the first chapter of Lenin's pamphlet, "What Is to Be Done?"

affecting especially relations with other Communist movements. Desiring an extension of its influence as a nation and believing its ideological formulations to be correct, Peking actively seeks to subvert Soviet influence and to replace it with its own throughout the entire Communist community. Whether or not there was ever an agreement on spheres of influence between Moscow and Peking, it is now wholly ignored. Indeed one of the most naked aspects of Sino-Soviet rivalry today is this sharp competition for influence in Communist movements everywhere, not excluding the bloc itself.

In addition to the foregoing explanations of China's apparent intransigence, a few others deserve brief notice. Economics, it is argued, affects Chinese behavior. Locally-caused frustrations lead to desperate remedies at home and, in consequence, more truculent postures abroad; there is resentment over the meager assistance from the Soviet Union. Peking feels that the U.S.S.R. should assume a greater responsibility for China's well-being; the volume of Soviet aid to India and the U.A.R., for instance, is agonizing to the Chinese when they contemplate their own needs. Similarly, Moscow's persistent refusal to provide China with nuclear arms was looked upon, it is argued, as a breach of faith. Peking therefore was goaded by these frustrations into using against Moscow the only weapon a Marxist can use against a Marxist—the charge of deviation. It is argued also that the personality clash between Khrushchev and Mao, which came to light especially during the Bucharest conference in 1960, has grown to such proportions that any resolution of the crisis as long as both hold power is unimaginable.

And for the historian there is the consideration—perhaps not sufficiently explored to date—that China's present isolation is nothing new; that the most recent (Soviet) attempt

to bring China into the world has failed as all previous attempts have failed; that after a brief interlude of a worldliness of sorts following the Communist seizure of power in 1949, China is reverting to its traditional and majestic isolation and self-sufficiency.¹⁰

No catalogue of reasons for the behavior of so large and complex a nation as China can be entirely satisfactory or complete and the present list is no exception. The reasons indicated here are suggestive, not definitive.

Since Moscow's relationship with the Chinese Communists over the years intrudes itself persistently into this discussion of Peking's role in the bloc, it is worth remarking that some distortion of the relationship has been caused by American judgments of it. At the end of World War II, for instance, a widely held notion that the Chinese Communists were mere "agrarian reformers," and therefore not intimately linked to Moscow, prepared us very inadequately for the alliance that in fact emerged during the ensuing years.¹¹ After the Communists came to power in China, public opinion shifted to the view that the Sino-Soviet alliance was, after all, extraordinarily firm and our appraisals of Communist strength were adjusted, and sobered, accordingly. Now there is a tendency to see deep and irreconcilable divisions between China and Russia and ingenious reasons are discovered to show why this must inevitably be so—reasons that do little credit to our earlier perception since many of the considerations supporting them have always been present.

This is, after all, a relationship between states, not unlike others, and therefore subject to certain fluctuations which are not always predictable. The causes of division between Russia and China have been suffi-

(Continued on page 180)

¹⁰ This interpretation was suggested by Marc Mancall, of the East Asian Institute at Harvard, during a lecture delivered at Dartmouth College in May, 1962.

¹¹ A discussion of the "agrarian reformer" thesis and its impact on American policy is included in the author's *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (Columbia, 1958), pp. 1-4.

Charles B. McLane visited Southeast Asia in 1961 and 1962 in connection with research on Soviet policy in that area. In 1961, he taught at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and travelled in the U.S.S.R. He is the author of *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946*.

Discussing Communist China's guerrilla offensive, this specialist comments: "... what makes Chinese military power in South and Southeast Asia so formidable is not so much its military power-in-being as its apparent political and psychological willingness to use war and the threat of war as a constant element of its foreign policy."

Red China's Aims in South Asia

BY BERNARD B. FALL

Associate Professor of Government, Howard University

THE GHOST of the "Yellow Peril" again stalks the chanceries and military staffs of the West, and the several uncommitted countries uncomfortably situated along Red China's southern frontier. Tension has built up again in the Taiwan Straits and India has acquired Soviet military hardware to defend herself against Communist Chinese encroachments along her northern frontier.


Not that pressure along that border is anything new. It has in fact existed since December, 1949, when troops of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) arrived on the borders of North Vietnam and thus sealed the fate of the French in their struggle against the Vietminh.¹ Pressure along the Burmese boundary began in the summer of 1956, followed by the crushing of the Tibetan revolt in March, 1959, and the beginning of serious Sino-Indian border incidents in September of the same year. In the case of Laos, general charges of Red Chinese participation in the civil war by the right-wing Laotian administration had been made as early as November, 1959, but specific accusations of Red Chinese military participation were made only in May, 1962. Military cooperation between Red China and Communist North Vietnam is, of course, a matter of record. Thus, the

Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.) is indeed heavily committed along 3,000 miles of border including some of the most difficult terrain in the world.

Thus, speculation about Red Chinese "war aims" in South and Southeast Asia must include at least a cursory examination of Chinese military capabilities. These, depending upon the expert and the occasion, are depicted as fearsome and almost invincible. It is certain that the P.L.A. is no "paper tiger." Still it is by no means the irresistible juggernaut it may appear to be to a small Asian nation with some two to twenty million people, living in its shadow. What makes Chinese military power in South and Southeast Asia so formidable is *not* so much its military power-in-being as its apparent political and psychological willingness to use war and the threat of war as a constant element of its foreign policy.

Red China's real military strength lies in her ability to fight "sub-limited" wars, i.e., operations of a conventional or guerrilla nature which are unlikely to bring her into direct conflict with the United States. In that field, the Chinese Communists have shown themselves fighters of immense ability, and masterful theoreticians of revolutionary war. In fact, one can find the seeds of the Sino-Soviet diversity of opinions on war in Mao Tse-tung's own 1936 opus, *Strategic*

¹For an examination of Indochinese combat operations, see the author's *Street Without Joy: Indochina at War* (Harrisburg: Stackpole: 1961).



CHINA'S BORDER AREAS

Problems of China's Revolutionary War. In this book Mao chided the "incorrect views" of Communists who believe "that it is enough to follow the guiding laws in [sic] the civil war in the Soviet Union . . . if we copy them and apply them mechanically and allow no change whatsoever, it will also be like whittling down our feet to fit the shoes, and we shall be defeated."²

Thus, even at a time of total military weakness, Mao believed that the Chinese way was the better way (or, in any case, better than the Russian way). Seen from Mao's viewpoint, very little has happened since in the Far East that would make the Chinese inclined to believe that the Russians are particularly apt in dealing with the United States in Asia. The Korean War, started by and large at Russian behest, turned into a meat-grinder in which even the intervention of hordes of Chinese "People's Volunteers" could bring about a draw on a line only a

few miles from where it had been three years earlier; with the sole difference that all of North Korea with its sizeable industrial plant had been ruined by American bombers.

One year later, Soviet designs in Europe—a vague hope that "going easy" on France in Indochina might induce the Mendès-France regime to wreck the Nato alliance—compelled the Vietminh and its Chinese supporters to accept a cease-fire line on the seventeenth parallel. Thus Russia's Asian allies were deprived of the rightful fruits of military victory. As is now known, the French, on the basis of the brutal military facts alone, would have settled on the fourteenth parallel, thus depriving non-Communist South Vietnam of any chance of survival.

It was largely Soviet pressure (and not, as the Dulles hagiographers have it, the late Secretary's first "brinkmanship" threat) which brought Chou En-lai, and through him, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, around to a compromise. Politically and militarily, this compromise was a slap at the Vietminh and

² Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, First English Edition, Peking 1954: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 3-4.

one which, in 1962, compels it to fight a far more dangerous war against a better-armed and American-supported enemy. And, as will be seen, the Laos cease-fire negotiated in Geneva in July, 1962, also constituted at least in part a frustration of Red Chinese designs in favor of a more gradual Soviet policy.³

As seen from Peking, therefore, Soviet policies in South Asia and the Far East have not only been signally unsuccessful in furthering Chinese national aims but have also been subject to serious errors of judgment. It is understandable for Peking—even in the absence of any ideological differences—to pursue a policy in her own border areas more in consonance with the C.P.R.'s own objectives. Those objectives are:

1. Resolution of old or newly-created border conflicts with Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Burma;
2. Support of guerrilla and subversive movements, notably in Laos and Thailand;
3. Support of "Wars of Liberation," such as that of North Vietnam against South Vietnam; and
4. Unilateral guarantees against "aggression" by pro-Western states, as given in 1960 by the C.P.R. to the non-contiguous kingdom of Cambodia.

Since this article deals specifically with China's military problems in her border areas,

³ As George F. Kennan points out in his masterful *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, Boston: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1961, pp. 260-277, the Soviet Union also grossly miscalculated when it forced the Chinese Communist party into a collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek that nearly brought about its total physical annihilation between 1927 and 1936. Stalin once more miscalculated when in 1945-1948 he did not believe in an early victory of the Chinese Communists over the Chiang regime.

⁴ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question*, New Delhi, Gov't of India Press, 555 pp., maps. See also various Indian *White Papers* on the subject, or Bulletin No. 40 of December 18, 1961, C.P.R. Embassy in Phnom-Penh, "Déclaration du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la République Populaire de Chine sur la Question de la Frontière entre la Chine et l'Inde."

⁵ Government of India, *White Paper I* (1954-1959), p. 97.

the Sino-Indian border dispute as such will not be discussed here.⁴ In strictly military terms, then, Chinese operations along the India-Nepal-Sikkim-Bhutan border were of the border infiltration variety by Chinese regular forces. In their subsequent negotiations with India, the Chinese themselves asserted that their forces had crossed over into the Aksai Chin area of northeastern Ladakh as early as 1950, without encountering any Indian opposition. They began building a transversal highway connecting Sinkiang with Tibet after having surveys in 1954-1955. That highway was completed two years later.

BORDER CONFLICTS

The first serious incident reported along the Sino-Indian frontier came, however, from an area 200 miles further south. There, on September 10, 1956, a Chinese Army patrol operating in the Shipki-La pass (see map, p. 137), threw stones at an Indian Border Security Force unit and threatened to throw hand grenades. At the same time, the C.P.R. began to complain about Indian "incursions" on Tibetan soil. Finally, on October 18, 1958, India complained to the C.P.R. about the Ladakh highway, which had been completed in September, 1957. The C.P.R. answered the complaint by a counter-charge of her own (the Indians had sent a reconnaissance party to photograph the road), and the Sino-Indian border crisis was on in earnest. When a unit of 50 Chinese, led by an officer, crossed the easternmost corner of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the direction of Burma on September 28, 1958, all of India's boundary with China had become insecure. The outbreak of the Tibetan rebellion in March, 1959, further exacerbated the situation; in August, Chinese troops occupied eight Bhutanese villages lying in an enclave surrounded by Tibetan territory. Bhutanese couriers using a traditional road crossing through Tibetan territory were arrested and beaten up.⁵ On August 26, 1959, severe fighting broke out at Longju (NEFA) in the course of which C.P.R. troops overran the border post and caused numerous casualties to the Indian garrison.

From the Indian notes one can discover the genuine bewilderment of the New Delhi officials. They tried to believe to the last moment that they were dealing with an essentially normal border incident situation and not with a deliberate military attempt at changing the existing frontier. Yet the Chinese pattern was essentially sound and simple: light patrols, followed by stronger reconnaissance parties which in the case of immediate Indian opposition (totally absent for *five* years in the Aksai Chin area!) made out the *prima facie* case for Chinese permanent occupancy. Any later Indian reaction was merely treated as an Indian intrusion of Chinese soil. As of mid-1962, the C.P.R. has not yielded to India any of the positions it has thus far occupied.

At the same time, the C.P.R. used the same pattern of small-scale infiltration on the defenseless buffer states of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. India, obviously unable to dislodge China from northern Ladakh and the NEFA border posts, was equally unsuccessful in recovering the eight Bhutanese village enclaves. Nepal, from whom China wanted such tiny border changes (one slope of Mount Everest, for example) as to suggest that they were for prestige purposes only, yielded late in 1960. Pakistan accepted a joint settlement of the border in northwestern Kashmir for the good reason that the C.P.R.'s willingness to discuss the matter at all with a hated member of Seato gave added weight to Pakistan's claims of sovereignty over all Kashmir. Red China rode roughshod over India's anguished feelings and concluded talks with Pakistan in May, 1962.

This left only Burma and India as hold-outs. In Burma, the same pattern was applied as in India.⁶ Burmese troops pursuing Chinese nationalist guerrilla remnants in Wa State in 1953 all of a sudden "discovered" C.P.R. troops on stretches of what hitherto had been considered Burmese territory (just as India had suddenly "discovered" a motor highway on its soil). Fighting between

Burmese and P.L.A. forces broke out in 1955. The Chinese strongly hinted to the Burmese that all of the country to the north of the twenty-fifth parallel (about one-fourth of the country) had become Burmese as a result of "British imperialist aggression." The appearance of Chinese maps, showing some 70,000 square miles of northern Burma as Chinese, prepared the Burmese for the worst. The final settlement—which involved a real trade of roughly comparable tracts and not a unilateral surrender of Burmese territory to the C.P.R.—came almost as an unheard-of example of Red Chinese sweet reasonableness. The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty signed on January 4, 1961, not only settled Sino-Burmese relations on an even keel, but completed the total *isolation* of India in her own border quarrel with her northern neighbor. All this was accomplished by an extremely intelligent combination of diplomatic pressure and very restricted military fighting—small enough to avoid the kind of invasion scare that would send the country under pressure to clamor for United Nations or United States help; but strong and bloody enough to show that the C.P.R. meant business.

SUBVERSION SUPPORT

Thailand, since the landing there of American troops in May, 1962, has become a center of attention as a possible target for Communist subversion. It is safe to predict that present official reporting on Thailand is at least as heedlessly optimistic as it was on Vietnam in 1959. Not that the Communist sub-structure of Thailand is very strong: it is merely that the hold of Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat's government over the country is in many areas rather weak. The Chinese terrorists (CT's) from Malaya have found southern Thailand far more congenial than the relentless tracking to which they are exposed south of the border. In northeastern Thailand, the Thai government has simply never been able to control effectively the 70,000 Communist Vietnamese refugee-settlers who have been living there in compact colonies and camps since 1946 and who are under tight Communist discipline. They are

⁶ Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1961, pp. 174-183.

being shipped back to North Vietnam under the terms of a Thai-North Vietnamese accord concluded in 1959 and renewed in 1962 (in itself an admission of Thai weakness) but still they are numerous enough to create havoc along the sensitive Mekong border.

Three Communist parties operate side-by-side in Thailand: the Thai Communist party which is very weak but which, thanks to the ham-handedness of Bangkok, is rapidly being provided with its own set of martyrs; the Vietnamese Communist party (*Lao-Dong*) which controls the Vietnamese; and, finally, the Thai branch of the Chinese Communist party (C.C.P.). The latter is extremely active in building up political and economic "bases" among the large (perhaps three million) and very prosperous Chinese community. Chinese students with Thai passports have little difficulty in reaching Singapore from which they depart for several years of studies in the C.P.R. In May, 1962, an important Chinese Communist network was uncovered in Pitsanuloke. Significantly, it was located in a Chinese school.

In neighboring Laos, Communist Chinese operations were, during the early stages of the Laotian civil war, strictly limited to the Sino-Laotian border areas. When I did field research in the Namtha-Muong Sing area in the summer of 1959, the constant visits of what were euphemistically called "political pirates" in the surrounding mountaineer villages were public knowledge. Sze-Mao in neighboring Yunnan was a training center for Pathet Lao cadres. In addition, there were also infiltrations by Chinese Communist cadres of the Ho tribe who were blood brothers of the Laotian Ho of the Muong-Sing area. When Muong-Sing was captured by anti-Right wing forces in May, 1962, the Vientiane government immediately charged that regulars of the P.L.A.'s forty-third Division had been involved in the capture. While this, like so many other charges which emanated from Vientiane, could never be substantiated, there

is little doubt that Ho tribesmen were involved and that at least some of them could very well have come from Red China.⁷

With regard to the over-all direction of the latter part of the Pathet Lao rebellion, there cannot be any doubt that Red China had been resolutely eliminated from it by a joint Russian and North Vietnamese effort. The exact reason for that particular power play is unclear. It could be part of the Sino-Russian tug-of-war. It could also be part of a Soviet attempt—which the United States, for the time being at least, is willing to buy at face value—to reduce tensions in Laos and give the neutral Souvanna Phouma regime a fighting chance. This would be a highly unlikely operation with Red China in the driver's seat. That does not mean that Peking has no rôle to play in Laos today; quite the contrary. Not being pre-occupied, as the Russians were, with the day-to-day conflict, the C.P.R. successfully concentrated on some longer-range essentials and concluded with the opposition regime at the *Plaine des Jarres* several accords of an economic nature which will have far-reaching effects on Laos' future. Mutual airline landing rights were granted and, above all, the C.P.R. initiated the building of a motor road which may eventually connect Vientiane with Yunnan. Once this road is in operation and tied in with Laos' Road Number Seven which connects the North Vietnamese town of Vinh with the *Plaine des Jarres* (and which was rebuilt by Vietnamese Communist engineers in 1961), neutral Laos will have better connections with its Communist northern neighbors than with its non-Communist neighbors to the south. The recent tour throughout the Soviet bloc of the Lao neutralist and Pathet Lao military commanders, Generals Kong-Lê and Singkapo, which also led them through Peking and Hanoi, was used by the Chinese to impress their guests with their own will to destroy American power in Southeast Asia. Marshal Ho-Lung, the vice-premier of the C.P.R., told the Laotian visitors that "your victory constitutes a great encouragement for the Chinese people" at a time when the United States "commits troops along the

⁷ *Htoon Daily*, Rangoon, June 12, 1962, spoke of a build-up of Chinese Communist forces on the Laotian border near Meng-Mao, to match the American build-up in Thailand. Meng-Mao is reportedly connected with the Sinkiang-Tibet road.

Mekong which . . . mainly threaten China. . . . Let the Americans continue to play with fire. They will suffer an even greater defeat than those which they have suffered thus far.”⁸

“WAR OF LIBERATION”

Military ties between North Vietnam and the C.P.R. go back to the very first days of the arrival of P.L.A. troops on the Tonkinese border. The first elite units of Vietminh General Vo Nguyên Giap’s “Vietnam People’s Army” were trained on the Chinese firing ranges of Ching-Hsi and Nanning. By the end of 1950, more than 40 Vietminh battalions had gone through Chinese training camps. The Fifty-third Arsenal at Kun-Yang (Yünnan) began to work almost entirely for the needs of the V.P.A., and, as of 1952, Chinese military experts were attached to most of the technical units (artillery, combat engineers, signal corps) of the V.P.A. At Dien-bienphu, finally, Red Chinese fired the multi-rocket Soviet *katyushas* which demoralized the defenders in the last days of battle.⁹

Since then, military ties between the C.P.R. and North Vietnam have been close, although there is some evidence that General Giap himself and some of his best commanders are none too happy. In 1961, Giap in fact purged his staff of General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the V.P.A.’s chief political commissar whose pro-Peking sympathies were well-known. The close cooperation with Soviet military planners during the civil war in Laos—apparently, the Soviet equipment required in Laos was not even trans-shipped via China but brought in directly from Europe by ship—must have incited the Chinese to mend their fences with the Vietnamese People’s Army. A high-powered P.L.A. delegation, led by Marshal Yeh Chen-ying, visited General Giap in Hanoi in January, 1962. The subject of those talks was not officially revealed.

⁸ *Agence France-Presse*, Peking, June 10, 1962.

⁹ Fall, *Le Viet-Minh, 1945–1960*, Paris 1960: Armand Colin, pp. 181–224.

¹⁰ During combat operations in South Vietnam in June and July, 1962, recoilless cannon were captured in South Vietnam which were close copies of American models. They seem to have been produced in Communist China.

Peking has given Hanoi its full support in the guerrilla war against South Vietnam. While the Soviet Union has remained largely aloof from the Vietnamese problem so far in spite of being one of the two co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference, Red China has taken up the cudgels in favor of a full-scale “liberation” of South Vietnam. The “White Book” on North Vietnamese aggression issued by the Department of State in December, 1961, stated that small amounts of Chinese equipment had been found among the largely American and French equipment of the guerrillas. The report issued by the Indian and Canadian members of the three-nation [Poland is the third] International Control Commission in June, 1962, is silent on that subject, although it clearly establishes the fact of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam.¹⁰

Interestingly enough, many observers attribute neutral India’s willingness to brand North Vietnam as an aggressor to New Delhi’s own difficulties with Red China. Personal contacts with Indian officials in Indochina during 1961–1962 make this writer believe that there is some truth to that observation.

The C.P.R.’s commitment to defend neutral Cambodia against “imperialist aggression” by South Vietnam and Thailand, made in the form of a declaration by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, has for the first time given the small kingdom some sort of reassurance of not being a helpless victim in the hands of its neighbors. By the same token, that very reassurance has further exacerbated the already tense relations with its neighbors.

Since Cambodia has no common boundary with the C.P.R., Chinese Communist help would either have to come via neutral Laos

(Continued on page 181)

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Discussing Communist China's relations with the West, this author observes that Communist Chinese policy is limited by the "homogeneous" quality of the Communist leadership. "Almost all [the present leaders] are products of middle class Chinese homes and training—the class that felt most keenly the shame of China's 'rape' by the West; almost all are veterans of the 'Long March' of 1934–1935; almost all have done very little traveling outside of China, and most of that in the 'fraternal' countries of the Communist Bloc."

Peking and the West

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In 1949 the Chinese branch of the "Wave of the Future" met the success that all good Marxist-Leninists had predicted for it, albeit unexpectedly early.¹ The new regime, organized as the *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo* (People's Republic of China), won immediate acceptance by the members of the Communist Bloc, with some frictions arising later. In its relations with the West, however, all has not been so smooth for Communist China or, indeed, for the West. Neither has reacted to the other as their conceptions of each other demanded. Both have striven to continue to operate within narrow conceptual confines.

Peking's policy towards the West has been a strange mixture of Communist ideology and Chinese chauvinism. The policy of some Western nations towards Communist China² has been to accept China as a full-fledged member of the world community in the hope

that the Communist Chinese would then act in a manner befitting a member of our Western-oriented world community. Another group of Western states, led by the United States, has denied any role in the world community to Communist China, largely for "moral" and strategic reasons.

This duality of policy by the West has not followed the preconceptions of the Communist Chinese, who have reacted somewhat erratically: sometimes attempting to "fit" into the world, sometimes attacking any such idea. China's relations with the United Nations are a clear example of this behavior. Obviously Communist China would like to be a member of the United Nations, to be "restored" to its "legitimate rights," if only for the prestige of big power status. But China has never followed a rational program towards achieving this goal; it has insisted that it be accepted into the United Nations on its own terms with no compromise, allowing neutral nations it nearly, if not really, despises, to champion its cause in the face of its defiance.

The Chinese Communists initiated their own epoch of independent diplomatic existence with a deliberation and seriousness that ran counter to the Chinese "tradition." This tradition developed in the 25 years following the 1911 revolution that overthrew the Man-

¹ The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to Professor Paul M. A. Linebarger, who is currently on a research trip in Agana, Naha, and Taipei. Professor Linebarger and Dr. Harold Hinton have been the writer's graduate instructors at the S.A.I.S. Professor Linebarger made some of his personal files on this material available for the preparation of this article, but the author assumes sole responsibility for the views expressed.

² West European nations that now have some type of diplomatic relations with Peking are: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

chu dynasty. Characteristic of this period was the premature proclamation by various Chinese governments that they were "national" and "sovereign" when they held little more than a single city as a precarious "capital." Such was the case with the first Republic at Nanking in the autumn of 1911; Dr. Sun Yat-sen at Canton in the autumn of 1917; the Kuomintang Left at Hankow in the autumn of 1927; the Federal Revolutionary Republic at Foochow in 1933-1934; and many others, equally fragile and equally short-lived.

The Chinese Communists did maintain the *Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo* (Chinese Soviet Republic) from 1931 to 1937, when it was informally abandoned in favor of a nominal unification with the National Government following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This government, however, was not taken seriously, even by the U.S.S.R. Its lone sortie into international politics was a declaration of war against the Japanese in 1932—a declaration which was in reality an attempt to gain breathing space from Kuomintang military pressure. The Chinese Soviet Republic, centered in Kiangsi Province, was far from areas of Japanese activity.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist state had many fateful diplomatic contacts with the West before it was born as the People's Republic on October 1, 1949. These contacts developed after the United States entry into the Second World War, and the Communist Chinese acted not as citizens of a formal state, but as a separate army with military demands of its own, or as territorial governments within the body of the Republic of China. This initial phase of Chinese Communist diplomacy was based on informal contacts not only with the United States government, but also the British and Canadians as well as the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese.

Behind the current and by now long-standing Chinese Communist hatred of the United States, there was a period of *de facto* alliance between the United States and the

Chinese Communists, beginning with their first contacts in the summer of 1944 and ending with the humiliation and ejection of the last United States ambassador on the mainland. The alliance between the American armed forces and the Chinese Communists was looked on by Americans as a means of defeating the Japanese, and by the Chinese Communists for that same reason. The Chinese Communists also hoped to separate the Western powers from the then government of China, the Kuomintang-based Republic. This was the era of seeming Chinese Communist "reasonableness" versus Kuomintang "stubbornness" and "obstruction"; the era of the myth of the "agrarian reformers."³

As alliances went, this worked fairly well. It followed a similar alliance between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists—not a merger of identities, but merely an agreement on the common goal of defeating Japan. The start of the "Yenan-Washington Alliance" coincided with the visit of United States Vice-President Henry C. Wallace to Chungking in the summer of 1944. Its high point was reached with the establishment of an American-operated infantry school of Chinese Communist soldiers near Kalgan, Inner Mongolia, and the creation of United States supported "truce teams" to keep the Communists and Nationalists from civil war in the period before and after 1947. The alliance terminated with the Chinese Communist triumph on the mainland, when the Communists no longer needed American support on Chinese territory and were able to throw out old friends on the grounds that they might become future enemies. Ideological considerations precluded any evidences of proffered friendship.

THE EARLY YEARS

On the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Chinese Communist party, July 1, 1949, shortly before the proclamation of the People's Republic, and when victory was evident, the shape of Chinese Communist policy to come was authoritatively defined by Mao Tse-tung in *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*. After discussing China's early contacts with

³ See White, Theodore H. and Jacoby, Annalee, *Thunder Out of China*, New York, Sloane, 1946, for a work somewhat sympathetic to the Chinese Communists at this time.

the West, Mao stated that "Imperialist aggression shattered the Chinese dream of learning from the West." Rather, the Chinese must "travel the road of the Russians"; they must "lean to one side," that is, the "side of socialism," not that of "imperialism"; a "third road does not exist." 1949 was the year after the Tito "heresy" within the Communist Bloc, and it was suggested that attempts be made to encourage the Chinese Communists to follow the same path. Mao destroyed this illusion—"The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is our best teacher from whom we must learn"—but it was to remain alive in the West until after the Chinese Communist response to the Soviet launching of the sputniks in 1957, an illusion that certainly had some effects on Western policy-making.

Mao also categorically turned down the idea of aid from the British and American governments:

This is also a childish idea at the moment.

At present the rulers in Britain and the United States are still imperialists. Would they extend aid to a people's state?

Beginning with this ideological chip on the shoulder, the Chinese Communists did not hesitate to add a touch of chauvinism. Mao cited Chu Hsi, a philosopher of the Sung Dynasty, as saying, "Apply to anyone the method he has first used on others." He claimed this was his policy, applying "to imperialism and its lackeys . . . the same method with which they treated others." That is, he would treat the nations of the West with the same contempt that these nations once had shown in their relations with China earlier.

The implementation of this policy is readily seen in the story of Communist China's response to diplomatic recognition by a number of West European countries. Although very few problems accompanied the exchange of ambassadors between Peking and Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Finland, the contrary is true of relations with Norway, the Netherlands, and, of course, the United Kingdom. Norway was considered too pro-Amer-

ican and the Netherlands was tainted as a colonial power. As a result, the envoys sent by both to Peking in 1950 were not officially received until 1954.

The United Kingdom is indeed a special case, virtually the symbol of past imperialism in China. Despite an almost immediate recognition by the United Kingdom, the Chinese Communists in effect refused to recognize the United Kingdom for some time, the inference being that China cared little for the favor of a great Western power. In subsequent negotiations, Peking put forward a number of conditions, to which Britain replied only partly in the affirmative.⁴ Normal diplomatic relations have yet to be effected between the two, both maintaining *chargés d'affaires* rather than ambassadors in each other's capitals.

Peking's hostility towards the United States hardly needs to be illustrated, and began before the formal establishment of the regime. It is based partially on ideological and partially on what might be termed strategic grounds. In addition, it is an important adjunct to domestic policy. Ideologically, as dogmatic Marxist-Leninists, the Chinese Communists see the United States, the leader of the "capitalist, imperialist" world, as their natural enemy. Strategically, the United States is the only power that maintains the balance of Far East power against the Chinese Communists, frustrating them in their attempts at "liberating" Taiwan and other expansionist goals. Domestically, the Chinese Communists have had to combat a pro-United States feeling among the non-Communist intellectuals, and have used the United States as a hate-symbol to distract attention from the sacrifices that have been demanded of the Chinese people.

The immediate United States involvement in the Korean conflict only exacerbated this attitude. Reasoning within their ideological framework, the Chinese Communists expected an intervention similar to the Allied intervention in Russia after the First World War. This led them directly to "hate America" campaigns and the mass campaign against any counter-revolutionaries. The subsequent

⁴ See, for instance, Chen, Theodore H. E., *Relations between Britain and Communist China in Current History*, November, 1952.

entry of the Chinese Communist "volunteers" into Korea with the resultant branding of Communist China as an aggressor by the United Nations and the establishment of the embargo on strategic goods made the Chinese Communists turn even more against the West, and especially the United States. Since the Korean Armistice, there has been some amelioration of relations between Communist China and a number of West European nations, but this has been of necessity—the results of the Sino-Soviet conflict and economic disasters—not because of a real desire for friendship. China's attitude towards the United States, however, remains consistently negative.

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

The Chinese name for their own country is *Chung Kuo*, which literally means the Central Kingdom, a reflection of the ancient days when China, in the geographically isolated area of East Asia, developed a civilization distinctly superior to those of immediate areas, thus regarding itself as the center of the world. The Chinese people developed a strong superiority complex that was rapidly shattered in the face of the Western onslaught in the nineteenth century. The defeats and ignominies suffered during the numerous conflicts of this era still live in the memory of the Chinese people. The development of nationalism in the Western sense was an immediate result, as was the 1911 revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, against the *foreign* Manchu dynasty. Sun Yat-sen and other leaders of China, regardless of ideology, have since striven to restore China to what they believe is its rightful big power position. The Chinese Communists have fallen heir to this tradition; indeed, Sun Yat-sen is as much a part of the Chinese Communist pantheon as Marx or Lenin.

Working within this intense desire to advance China while at the same time trying to remain within a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework has called for tremendous

sacrifices on the part of the Chinese people: the Great Leap Forward. The fervor of nationalism is one of the few bits of fuel the Chinese Communists can use to fire up the furnace of sacrifice—and this fuel in turn is stoked by attacking foreigners in general, the "imperialistic" West more specifically, and the "war-mongering" United States in particular.

Closely related to the sacrifices demanded have been the changes in ideology and language. To become powerful, the Chinese Communists realize that China must be modernized. Ideologically the Chinese people must be changed from an agriculturally centered people—with emphasis on the family—to something more approximating the proletarian ideal. In the realm of language, the clumsy characters must be replaced—not only to facilitate modernization (scientific terms are almost hopelessly garbled in translation), but also to complete the divorce from China's cultural heritage.

As a part of the "Central Kingdom" heritage, and as a part of the immediate experience of the Chinese Communist leaders, there is a strong xenophobia in Communist China. The present leaders are a remarkably homogeneous group. Almost all are products of middle class Chinese homes and training—the class that felt most keenly the shame of China's "rape" by the West; almost all are veterans of the "Long March" of 1934–1935; almost all have done very little traveling outside of China, and most of that in the "fraternal" countries of the Communist Bloc. Mao Tse-tung, for instance, has been outside China twice, both times to Moscow.⁵ These characteristics show up as weaknesses in Chinese Communist policy, foreign as well as domestic: no experience softens ideology, and resultant problems seem beyond the comprehension of the leaders. Rather than acknowledge failure, they try the same method, only harder. This apparently has been the guiding rule until perhaps recently.

A distrust of foreigners extends far beyond Westerners. The U.S.S.R. is just as suspect, as are the "neutrals." Moreover, Peking's diplomacy seems to have second

⁵ See Klein, Donald W., *Peking's Leaders: A Study in Isolation in The China Quarterly*, Number 7, July–September, 1961.

thoughts that manage to ruin any possible good in any original action. Part of this problem may be traced to a shortage of trained diplomatic personnel. Although the Peking foreign service has recently been described as "becoming a well-developed career service, fortified by an expanding educational program to train future diplomats," the record of past performance has not been enviable. Certainly adequate information on conditions within those countries with whom China has diplomatic relations has not been available to guide policy-making, although available data is given a rigid ideological interpretation.


THE UNITED STATES

The Communist Chinese view of the United States has managed to remain basically the same during three United States Administrations: those of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, as vividly illustrated in the accompanying cartoons. The United States is pic-

tured as an imperialist, war-mongering nation, obviously interpreted in the image presented in Lenin's *Imperialism: the Last Stage of Capitalism*. It is a capitalist nation on its last legs, seeking imperialist adventures to keep the masses at home under control. Part of the evidence for this is the attempt to infiltrate the "colonies" of the United States, those countries whence the United States gets much of its raw materials, particularly in Latin America and Africa. This is, of course, also an attempt to apply Mao's concepts of guerrilla warfare on a global scale: instead of isolating a city from its hinterlands, isolate a country from its sources of materials. A *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) Observer concluded after six months of the Kennedy administration:

... Strategically we must despise imperialism while tactically we must take it seriously. On the one hand, because of its weakness, the people of the whole world have every reason to despise the Kennedy government; on the

KENNEDY




"The contradiction is no contradiction." In his right hand he holds a rocket with the inscription, "Aggressive policy of U.S."; in his left hand, shield with dove of peace. From *Meishu*, December, 1961, published in Peking.

EISENHOWER



The inscription on his coat reads: "Eisenhower"; the inscription on his horse; "Group of West European aggressors." From *Shih-chieh Chih-shih*, Feb. 17, 1951, published in Peking.

TRUMAN



Inscription on map reads: "Plan for expeditionary armies"; inscription on scroll held by Truman: "Plan for conquering the whole world"; inscription on scroll held by Marshall: "To assemble the soldiers in U. S."; inscription on scroll held by Eisenhower: "Unite forces of Western Europe"; and inscription on scroll held by Dulles: "Rearm the Japanese."
 From Shih-chieh Chih-shih, March 10, 1951, published in Peking

other hand, because of its adventurousness, the people of the world must also take it seriously tactically, must maintain a high degree of vigilance at all times, and go on waging a face-to-face struggle against the policies of war and aggression of U.S. imperialism. . . .

The Chinese Communists keep an eye out for any evidence that might indicate that the United States is falling apart as predicted. Radio Peking broadcasts have emphasized the recent declines in stock prices as well as declines in steel production. Interestingly, they often quote *U. S. News and World Report* to confirm their conclusions.

Despite the oft-quoted phrase of the Chinese that the United States is a "paper tiger," certain anomalies prove that this is not their real idea of the United States, that they respect United States strength. Perhaps clearest proof of this lies in the over 100 meetings

held in Geneva and Warsaw on the ambassadorial level by the United States and Communist China. These meetings were held on the invitation of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference in 1955, initially to discuss the question of United States fliers held prisoner in Communist China. Such talks have proved a route of communication between the two hostile governments; an official and permanent diplomatic contact short of the diplomatic recognition that neither wants.

Other proof is offered by the fact that despite Communist threats over the years to "liberate" Taiwan and especially the off-shore islands, no threat has been followed through, even though there certainly have been some "hot" moments. Indeed, with the recent economic difficulties, the fiasco of refugees fleeing to Hong Kong, and murmurs

of possible revolt in Southeast China (the hot-bed of Chinese revolution), for the first time in 13 years the Chinese Communists seem really to fear an invasion by that "running dog of the American imperialists," Chiang Kai-shek.

Certain aspects of the United States-Communist China relationship have had humorous sidelights. There is, for instance, the case of the "serious warnings." On September 4, 1958, the Communist Chinese unilaterally extended their territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles. The United States, as a matter of general policy, refused to recognize the change. On September 7, 1958, the Communist Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the first of the "serious warnings" to the United States because of an incursion either in or over the newly extended territorial waters. These have continued at a rate of about five a month until the total is now well over 200. Their significance, if any, has been ignored by the United States and probably even by the Chinese Communists. If they impressed any of the neutrals when they began, they undeniably have lost any meaning now. If anything, the Chinese Communists lose "face" as the number mounts with no reaction on the part of the United States.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that the Chinese Communists, in choosing the United States as their favorite enemy, have picked one of the safest enemies possible. Unlike many countries, the United States can be insulted and the insulter can get away with it; despite the possession of nuclear weapons, only a very extreme provocation would force the United States to use them. Unlike those countries that piously call themselves "peaceloving," the United States is genuinely peaceloving. An "affluent society," the United States has much more to lose in case of war. Finally, as a "status quo" nation, the United States can be trusted not to try to expand its territory.

Subsequent to the Communist victory on the mainland, the United States introduced a proposal in the United Nations

that the General Assembly study and make recommendations on the problem of the future of Taiwan—withdrawing it only after the Chinese Communists entered Korea. In the face of Chinese Communist inflexibility the United States assumed its present close relationship with Taiwan, and negotiated other defense pacts in the Far East and Southeast Asia that Peking calls "aggressive." Moreover, the Chinese Communist attitude towards British recognition does not encourage such an action on the part of the United States.

The beginnings of a solution of the impasse short of war depend more on the Chinese Communist leaders than on the West and the United States. These leaders, in the face of economic collapse on the mainland, will have to acknowledge the inadequacy of trite Marxist-Leninist solutions to China's problems, and thus allow for more flexible approaches. For the real Chinese problem is looming above this relatively short run problem of the "two" Chinas (which is nothing new in Chinese history). The real problem that would have existed had the Kuomintang remained in power, and that exists today, is the Malthusian problem of over-population.

A solution for the short-run problem may be some sort of United Nations presence much stronger than that in Palestine, performing some managerial functions as in the Congo. Indeed this might be applied to all the unhappily divided countries of the world and would be a genuine contribution to the lessening of world tensions.

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Although "there is no reason to doubt that sooner or later, probably within the next few years, Communist China will hold its first nuclear test and will then proceed to build up a modest stockpile of nuclear and perhaps thermonuclear weapons," this specialist believes that "The strategic superiority of the United States, in the Far East as well as on a worldwide scale, will remain enormous."

Communist China's Military Posture

BY HAROLD C. HINTON

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THERE IS a widespread impression that Communist China (C.P.R.) is a major and rapidly growing power which may soon alter the world's military power balance, that its leaders believe a Third World War is inevitable and will tend to benefit China's position relative to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it is essential that China be brought into an arms control agreement as soon as possible. These propositions may be greatly exaggerated.

For the past several years the total strength of Communist China's armed forces, known officially as the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.), has approximated 2.5 million, exclusive of some 700,000 troops of the Public Security Forces. The army consists of about 115 combat divisions, including only a few armored and airborne divisions, with a very limited amphibious capability. It has reasonably good nonnuclear Soviet equipment, although not the very latest. The navy is small and seems to be strong only in submarines (of which it has about 20), motor torpedo boats, and an almost infinite number of civilian junks that could be turned into

adequate transports and landing craft if needed. The air force is large (about 3,000 combat aircraft, most of them jets) but short on fuel and not very high in pilot quality, and it lacks heavy bombers and the most advanced Soviet fighters. The strength of all three services is heavily concentrated in the eastern part of the country. Manpower is recruited via conscription, or, more accurately, selective service. The admitted military budget—as in the Soviet Union, actual military expenditures are no doubt considerably higher—approximates \$2.5 billion annually.¹

Military policy is determined by the Politburo of the Communist Party (C.P.C.), or more precisely by its Standing Committee, composed of Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Marshal Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, Defense Minister Marshal Lin Piao, and General Secretary Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Responsibility for implementation, coordination and supervision apparently rests with the Military Committee of the C.P.C.'s Central Committee, about which little is known. From these party organs directives normally go to the Ministry of Defense within the State Council (cabinet) and to the P.L.A. General Staff, which appears to be subordinate to the Ministry.²

On those occasions to date when it has been called on to perform functions for which the Ministry of Public Security's People's

¹ Cf. Allan S. Nanes, "Communist China's Armed Forces," *Current Scene*, Hong Kong, vol. 1, no. 16 (25 Oct. 1961).

² Harold C. Hinton, "Political Aspects of Military Power and Policy in Communist China," in Harry L. Coles, ed., *Total War and Cold War*, Ohio State University Press, 1962, pp. 276-278.

Armed Police (separated from the P.L.A. in 1955) are normally adequate, the P.L.A. has proved able to maintain a reasonable standard of order and internal security in the predominantly Chinese areas of the country. In minority regions, where anti-Chinese as well as anti-Communist feeling runs high, the P.L.A. has a harder time; for example, a serious revolt has been going on in Tibet since late 1955. Barring a politico-economic collapse of the Chinese Communist regime, the P.L.A. is probably adequate to deter or at least to repel any likely nonnuclear attack on Communist China, including a possible "return to the mainland" by the forces of the Republic of China (Nationalist China). It is probably also capable of asserting control over at least some of the frontier regions in dispute with neighboring countries, deterring attacks on nearby friendly states (North Korea and North Vietnam), and assisting operations by their armies to an extent short of involving the C.P.R. in a major war with the United States.

The P.L.A. is seriously hampered, however, by its lack of a real strategic capability—heavy bombers, medium range and intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The strategic punch of the Communist Bloc in the Far East, which is a very powerful one, belongs to the Soviet Union, not China.

Despite the P.L.A.'s list of limitations, the record would suggest an impending Chinese military adventure: roughly a year intervened between the first Soviet nuclear detonation (September, 1949) and the Chinese intervention in Korea (October, 1950), between the first Soviet hydrogen bomb test (August, 1953) and the initiation by the C.P.R. of the first Quemoy crisis (September, 1954), and between the first Soviet I.C.B.M. test (August, 1957) and the second Quemoy crisis (launched in August, 1958). Marshal Malinovsky claimed at the Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (October, 1961) that the Soviet Union had solved the problem of the anti-missile

missile. This time, however, China has taken virtually no public notice of the Soviet claim, and Malinovsky himself appears to have warned the C.P.R. in advance against precipitate action by saying, in highly unusual phraseology, that the Soviet Union would retaliate against anyone who attacked "socialist countries friendly to us."³

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Chinese Red Army dates its origins from August 1, 1927, when Communist officers in the Fourth Army of the Kuomintang's National Revolutionary Army led their men in a mutiny and attempted unsuccessfully to seize the city of Nanchang. Soon afterward guerrilla units under Communist leadership came into being in various areas of Central and South China. Of these, the most important was the force that began to emerge in 1928 in the Hunan-Kiangsi border area under the competent professional soldier, Chu Teh, and the agitator and organizer, Mao Tse-tung. Chu provided the strictly military, and Mao, the political elements of a highly sophisticated and thoroughly politicized technique of guerrilla warfare.

After several years of being badly battered by much larger forces of the National Government, most of the Chinese Red Army undertook in 1934–1935 a very difficult and arduous withdrawal to Northwest China, known as the Long March, the remainder staying underground in the south to re-emerge after the Japanese invasion in 1937. That invasion gave the main body in the Northwest a respite from Nationalist pressures and in fact brought about a state of nominal and temporary cooperation with the Nationalists against the Japanese, under cover of which the Communists began to expand at the expense of both.

In the months following V-J Day, the Communist and Nationalist armies jockeyed for position while both sides fended off American efforts, supplemented in all probability by covert Soviet pressures on the Communists, to bring them into a politico-military coalition as an alternative to civil war. The Nationalists ignored much American military advice but

³ *Izvestiia*, Jan. 25, 1962, quoted in John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," *Orbis*, spring 1962, p. 64.

benefited considerably from American aid in the form of transport and equipment, as well as captured Japanese weapons. The Communists were greatly helped by being admitted by the Soviet Army into Manchuria, being allowed to establish a base there, and being given access to large stocks of captured Japanese equipment. The two sides then began to fight each other, the Nationalists fighting essentially positional warfare against an opponent fighting predominantly guerrilla warfare. Badly led, badly fed Nationalist troops were defeated by the Communist forces. By the autumn of 1949, in China proper it was all over but the mopping up.⁴

The P.L.A. as the Chinese Red Army was renamed in 1948, emerged from the civil war victorious but swollen to enormous size (about five million) with Nationalist defectors of questionable reliability. It was divided into four Field Armies, which had strong regional loyalties and posed an obstacle to centralized control and organizational and technical modernization. Soviet military aid having barely begun, this awkward giant, or a substantial fraction of it, was thrown into Korea on a narrow front against an enemy vastly superior in firepower. Chinese casualties were colossal, and the need for modernization and for avoidance of overt military challenges to the United States was driven home.

⁴ General L.-M. Chassin, *La conquête de la Chine par Mao Tse-tung*, Paris, 1952; F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*, Princeton University Press, 1956; Colonel Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, Harrisburg, Pa.; Military Service Publishing Company, 1951; S. M. Chiu, *A History of the Chinese Communist Army*, doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1958.

⁵ S. M. Chiu, "The Chinese Communist Army in Transition," *Far Eastern Survey*, Nov., 1958, pp. 168-175.

⁶ See Ralph L. Powell, *Everyone a Soldier: The Chinese Communist Militia*, *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1960, pp. 100-111.

⁷ PLA General Political Department directive, Sept. 20, 1958.

⁸ PLA General Political Department directive, Nov. 21, 1957.

⁹ PLA General Political Department directive, March 13, 1959.

¹⁰ Alice L. Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Prentice-Hall, 1962, pp. 37ff.

¹¹ David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, Oct.-Dec., 1961, pp. 63-76.

The over-all size of the P.L.A. was pruned, the Field Armies were dissolved in 1953-1954, and reorganization and modernization along Soviet lines and with Soviet aid were accelerated. Among the major innovations were the formation of a Ministry of National Defense and the inauguration of conscription in 1954, and the establishment of regular ranks, decorations and terms of service for officers in 1955.⁵

The "Great Leap Forward," which began in 1958, had a considerable impact on the P.L.A. Some of its members were sent, allegedly as individuals rather than as units, into the newly formed "people's communes," partly no doubt as a reminder to the peasants of the existence of armed force in support of the regime's objectives. An unwelcome semi-competitor to the P.L.A. arose in the shape of a vast, poorly armed militia, militarily worthless but useful as a labor force and a means of internal control.⁶ P.L.A. officers were required to serve in the ranks for one month a year,⁷ their dependents were sent back to their native villages,⁸ and the entire P.L.A. was told to perform labor in connection with the "Great Leap Forward" for up to two months a year.⁹

All this was apparently too much for Marshal P'eng Te-huai, the Defense Minister, although up to that time he had appeared to favor the subordination of strictly military considerations to the political and economic objectives of the C.P.C.¹⁰ It is likely, although not certain, that P'eng broke the elementary rules of intra-party disputation by taking his case to Khrushchev while in Eastern Europe in the spring of 1959.¹¹ In any case, P'eng was quietly removed in September, 1959, as a "right opportunist."

CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DOCTRINE

The military thought of Mao Tse-tung has dominated the Chinese Red Army since about 1937 almost as much as Stalin's "permanently operating factors" colored Soviet military thought and practice until his death in 1953. The essence of Mao's strategy, as portrayed in his writings, is to harass the enemy by means of carefully organized guerrilla war-

fare and then, when he is exhausted and over-extended, to deal him decisive blows at selected points with large armies assembled for the occasion.¹²

In 1954, certain elements, at least of the P.L.A. command, began to display a growing understanding of the implications of inter-continental nuclear warfare. This understanding manifested itself mainly among the professionally-oriented officers of the General Staff, led (until his relief on October 12, 1958) by Chief of Staff Su Yü. These men stressed the threat of an enemy surprise attack and the need for powerful, and expensive, forces-in-being with their own independent nuclear capability. They deprecated the use of the P.L.A. as a labor force and at least by implication denied the relevance of Mao's military thought and rigid party controls over the P.L.A. to the situation.

On the other hand, a group of officers centering in the Ministry of Defense, led by P'eng Te-huai and oriented more toward party loyalty than military professionalism, favored a reduction in the C.P.R.'s military budget and the use of the P.L.A. as a labor force in the interests of long-term economic development, defended the thought of Mao Tse-tung and party controls in the P.L.A., and advocated reliance on the Soviet Union rather than on an indigenous nuclear deterrent.¹³ In actuality, the party has tried in true dialectical fashion to combine the best features of both schools by mixing an effort

toward an independent nuclear capability with the essentials of the more politicized position favored by the second school.

SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS

For a number of reasons, of which the most important is official secrecy, it is very difficult to estimate the value of Soviet military aid to the C.P.R. It appears that through 1957 the value of such aid approximated \$2 billion, about half of it covered by Soviet credits.¹⁴ Even less is known of the situation since 1957, except that there do not appear to have been any further Soviet credits.

Since this aid has not reached the point of endowing the C.P.R. with a real strategic capability, it may be more important to inquire to what extent the Soviet Union has shown itself willing to lend the C.P.R. the support and protection of its own capability. The answer is that the Soviet Union has been extremely cautious in this respect.¹⁵ The Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 promises a joint response to an attack on either ally by Japan or any ally of Japan, meaning the United States. Never at any time during the Korean War or since has the Soviet Union given any convincing sign that it regarded a *casus belli* under the terms of the alliance as imminent.

It is true that Khrushchev made some threats to the effect that an attack on the C.P.R. would be an attack on the Soviet Union in 1958, during the Quemoy crisis, but he really did not go beyond what had already been said in the 1950 treaty and in any case withheld his "threat" until the day after an exchange of conciliatory messages between Communist China and the United States had made it almost certain that there would be no Sino-American war at that time. On October 5, the day before the expiration of a Nationalist ultimatum to the C.P.R. to stop shelling Quemoy or face air attack on its gun positions, Khrushchev made it clear that his guarantee did not apply to a Nationalist-Communist encounter in the absence of an American attack on the China mainland. The C.P.R. announced the first of a series of ceasefires on the following day.¹⁶ Khrushchev's much more belligerent remarks to Averell Harriman¹⁷ in

¹² See Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, New York: Praeger, 1961; *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, New York: International Publishers, vol. 2; Wao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961, pp. 157-176. Cf. Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.

¹³ Hsieh, *op. cit.*, chapter 2.

¹⁴ Cf. Allen S. Whiting, "'Contradictions' in the Moscow-Peking Axis," *Journal of Politics*, Feb., 1958, pp. 127-161.

¹⁵ Cf. S. F. Giffin, "Tomorrow's Military Matrix," *World Politics*, Apr., 1962, pp. 443-438.

¹⁶ Thomas, *loc. cit.*; Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Dec. 1959, especially p. 1084.

¹⁷ *Life*, July 13, 1959.

July, 1959 are probably to be explained by the fact that the Taiwan Strait was quiet at the time and by a hope on Khrushchev's part that he could intimidate the United States into backing down in the event Communist Chinese started trouble in the strait to greet his forthcoming visit to Peking for the October 1 anniversary, as it had for his corresponding visit in 1954.

The conclusion seems to be that the Soviet Union shows roughly as much nervousness over possible Chinese belligerency as does the United States, and perhaps with more reason. The U.S.S.R. is reported, as an example, to have refused to be drawn into a joint Sino-Soviet naval command in the Pacific, for fear of involvement in a war over Taiwan.¹⁸

TOWARD A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

It is not difficult to list the probable reasons why the C.P.R. wants nuclear weapons of its own. They are a necessary though not sufficient condition for entry into the select ranks of the superpowers, to which Communist China aspires. Without them, it is well aware of its comparative helplessness in the face of American strategic power, in the absence of the effective Soviet protection which Khrushchev has shown himself unwilling to extend. With them, the C.P.R. might hope to "liberate" Taiwan and the offshore islands, or at least to deter a Nationalist invasion of the mainland, to exert greater politico-military pressures on other Asian countries, and to carry increased weight in the cold war and international relations in general.

The beginning of the C.P.R.'s nuclear program appears to date from a Sino-Soviet technical cooperation agreement of October, 1954, under which the C.P.R. was to ship uranium to the Soviet Union and the C.P.R. was to receive a research reactor (which it finally got in 1958), enriched uranium, and limited technical assistance in the nuclear field (in-

itially nonmilitary, so far as is known).¹⁹ With the Soviet I.C.B.M. test in August, 1957, and Sputnik I in October the C.P.R. decided to press for firmer strategic guarantees and for the transfer of an operational nuclear capability.

Such was probably the purpose of a high level Chinese military mission under P'eng Te-huai that visited the Soviet Union in November, 1957. It was apparently told that the C.P.R. would be given some missiles, but no nuclear warheads, and that the promised reactor would be delivered shortly so that the C.P.R. could begin to produce its own warheads.

The realization that the Chinese would have to acquire nuclear capability largely on their own, an expensive process, may have been one of the considerations in Liu Shao-ch'i's mind when he announced on December 2, 1957, the month after the military conversations in Moscow, that the C.P.R. would catch up with Great Britain in total output of major industrial commodities within 15 years.²⁰ Britain, the third and at that time the last member of the "nuclear club," had just completed a series of hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific, and Liu may have meant to imply that the C.P.R. would have to get along with no more foreign nuclear aid than the United States had given Great Britain. Thus the ensuing "Great Leap Forward," which was intended among other things to make possible the attainment of the goal that Liu had announced, may have had among its purposes the accumulation of capital for a nuclear weapons program.

Although Khrushchev felt he could not refuse cooperation altogether, he was (and is) clearly unenthusiastic about the prospect of China's becoming a nuclear power. At the end of 1957, at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference at Cairo, the Soviet delegation proposed a resolution in favor of an "atom-free zone" embracing Asia and Africa.²¹ The C.P.R. was rather belated and ambivalent in its response; Chou En-lai distorted the resolution by saying on February 10, 1958, that it stated that "Asia and Africa should be a peace zone in which no foreign

¹⁸ Edward Crankshaw, "Sino-Soviet Rift Held Very Deep," *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, Feb. 12, 1961.

¹⁹ Hsieh, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

²⁰ New China New Agency, Peking, Dec. 2, 1957.

²¹ Text in *Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958.

country should deploy nuclear and rocket weapons.”²² Khrushchev revived the concept in January, 1959, defining its scope this time as “the Far East and the entire Pacific area”; again the C.P.R.’s reaction was belated and apparently unenthusiastic.²³

In July and August, 1960, the Chinese learned that the 1960 harvest would be a poor one and that therefore Communist China would be unable to maintain the high rate of industrial growth planned for that year. Although the agricultural situation improved in 1961, it is obvious that the C.P.R. is still in the throes of a serious food crisis. As though that were not bad enough, the Soviet Union, in July and August, 1960, recalled its two or three thousand technicians—another body blow to China’s industrial program.²⁴

Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt that sooner or later, probably within the next few years Communist China will hold its first nuclear test and will then proceed to build up a modest stockpile of nuclear and perhaps thermonuclear weapons. The strategic superiority of the United States, in the Far East as well as on a worldwide scale, will remain enormous. Thus as long as the United States manifests the will to use that superiority if necessary, the strictly military significance of this process will be slight until the time (if it ever comes) when the C.P.R. begins to possess an invulnerable strategic deterrent and to approach nuclear parity with the United States and the Soviet Union. Chinese invulnerability, or in other words the ability to sur-

vive a hypothetical American first strike with enough of its power left to deal unacceptable damage to the United States on a second-strike basis, lies far in the future.²⁵

CHINESE COMMUNIST VIEW ON WAR

Much of the widespread alarm about the C.P.R.’s acquisition of nuclear weapons seems to stem from a belief that the Chinese leadership considers a Third World War inevitable and even, from its own standpoint, desirable. It is true that accusations to this effect are sometimes made by the C.P.R.’s enemies,²⁶ and that Chinese leaders sometimes make statements seeming to establish the validity of the accusations.²⁷ But they have never made a public authoritative statement to this effect, and the purpose of their occasional sinister remarks seems to be to frighten as many people as possible.

What the C.P.C. actually says, in public at any rate, is that a Third World War is a possibility, since the “imperialists” are constantly plotting to start it; but that fear of it should not be allowed to deter the “socialist camp” from maintaining a militant cold war struggle, which is allegedly the best way of preventing a third World War.

It is local wars, fought by “imperialists” against a “national liberation movement” (preferably Communist-led), an “oppressed nation” (an independent underdeveloped country), or perhaps a “socialist” (Communist) country, not a world war, that the C.P.C. says are inevitable. Any local war started by the “imperialists” must be fought resolutely by the “socialist camp,” which has the obligation to aid “national liberation movements” and “oppressed nations” by all necessary means.²⁸

The Chinese leadership is almost certainly aware that it lacks the ability to catalyze a major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even if it had that ability, it would be unlikely to take advantage of it since the C.P.R. too would almost certainly not escape unscathed. In fact, most of the industry it has built up so painfully would probably be wiped out, and its populace and agricultural lands would

²² Quoted in Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 105; emphasis added.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 156–161.

²⁴ Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961*, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 331–332.

²⁵ Cf. Leonard Beaton, “When Will China Have a Bomb?” *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Feb. 15, 1962.

²⁶ E.g. Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War*, Belgrade, 1960, which produces no proof whatever.

²⁷ E.g. the statement attributed to P’eng Te-huai and quoted in Hsieh, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁸ The most comprehensive single published statement of the CPC’s position on war is in “Long Live Leninism!” *Red Flag*, Apr. 16, 1960. See also Yü Chao-li (pseud.), “New Situation in the People’s Struggle Throughout the World,” *Red Flag*, Jan. 1, 1961.

suffer heavily from blast and fallout. Nothing in the C.P.C.'s past record, which since the Korean War has been one of caution in the face of superior force, suggests that it would be so suicidally irrational as to risk such a catastrophe.²⁹ By the same token, it is most unlikely that the Communist Chinese will press a local war with the United States to the point where American nuclear retaliation becomes a realistic possibility. The C.P.C.'s experience with the United States seems to have convinced it that the United States, although dangerous if directly provoked, has a high threshold of puzzled tolerance for ambiguous challenges, as in Laos. In short, the C.P.R. has probably reached the point where, like the Soviet Union, it has too much to lose to make a major war worth risking.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL

The C.P.R. clearly has no intention of adhering to any arms control arrangement that would tend to prevent it from attaining ultimate military parity with the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, which has conceded since 1959 that any arms control agreement would probably require Chinese participation and has implied under the doctrine of "partial responsibility" that it would be up to the Soviet Union to procure Chinese adherence, has in effect offered the C.P.R. a veto which it has been happy to accept. On January 21, 1960, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted a resolution to the effect that the C.P.R. would adhere to no arms control agreement which it had not taken part in negotiating and had not signed. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko recently accepted this proposition on behalf of his government.³⁰

Communist China tries without much success to mask its bearishness on arms control

behind a propaganda furor to the effect that it supports the Soviet Union's demand (accepted in principle by the United States) for "general and complete disarmament" (G.C.D.), but it surrounds its "support" with reservations and qualifications so strong as to render it virtually meaningless.

The Soviet Union appears genuinely to want general complete disarmament, provided it can be attained without too many accompanying political restrictions, on the ground that it can then pursue its objectives more freely, without fear of nuclear war.³¹ It may be that one of the reasons for the Soviet Union's erratic and unreasonable behavior in arms control negotiations is its awareness of Chinese objections and of the difficulty it would have in securing Chinese adherence should an agreement be reached. If the relatively friendly Soviet Union would have trouble in finding inducements sufficient to satisfy the Communist Chinese, the basically hostile United States would have even more trouble.

There is, in fact, no reason why the United States should make any damaging concessions in a pointless effort to woo an economically stricken C.P.R., which will be militarily weak (in a strategic sense) a long time. As we have seen, the C.P.R. has challenged the United States to a prolonged struggle, "neither war nor peace." We have no alternative, unless we wish to abandon all of East Asia to communism, but to accept the challenge, while retaining our strategic superiority as nearly intact as possible and remaining willing to use it if necessary.

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²⁹ Cf. Allen S. Whiting, "The Logic of Communist China's Policy," *The Yale Review*, August 1960, pp. 1-17.

³⁰ *Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1962—the day the United States resumed atmospheric nuclear testing.

³¹ Cf. Malcolm Mackintosh and Harry Willetts, "Arms Control and the Soviet National Interest," in Louis Henkin, ed., *Arms Control: Issues for the Public*, Prentice-Hall, 1961, pp. 161ff.

This author predicts an inexorable increase in Communist China's birth rate. "If growth continues at the given rate, within two decades the Republic's population will pass the billion mark!"

The Chinese Population Problem

By W. A. DOUGLAS JACKSON

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MAN MAY not live by bread alone, but Communist-dominated countries for the most part have had difficulties providing even that daily staple to their subject peoples. In the Soviet Union, the citadel of communism, after 30 years of collectivization and slightly less than a decade of post-Stalin changes and innovations designed to increase output, agriculture remains the Achilles' heel of Soviet economic growth. That the problem of food supply in the People's Republic of China, the most populous country in the bloc, has become in recent years most critical, is now substantiated by a wide array of evidence reaching Hong Kong, not to mention the flood of over 70,000 refugees that descended on that beleaguered Crown Colony in June, 1962.

China has always been a land of insecure harvests and periodic famine. Drought, floods, tropical storms, and other natural calamities have, since the beginning of historical record, periodically devastated parts of the land and inflicted untold hardship and suffering on the people. In view of this,

should one blame the present Peking regime for all the difficulties which have beset Chinese agriculture in the past few years? Perhaps not; yet, since the farm acreage affected by nature's hostility has grown phenomenally over the years of Communist control, one may assuredly conclude that the sweeping institutional changes imposed by Peking have intensely aggravated an already delicate balance between man and land. While it may be true, as one Western writer argues, "that the whole of China is not suffering from conditions of starvation,"¹ nevertheless, it is equally true that, with the reorganization of farm households into communes which was completed by mid-1958, Chinese agriculture received a shock, the recovery from which will necessitate almost Herculean efforts.

The essence of the Chinese problem is that there are too many mouths to feed from too little land. Although the over-all output of food has grown since the revolution, the number of mouths has been increasing annually at an even more rapid rate. No one knows for certain how large the population of mainland China is. Pre-Communist estimates ranged from 375 to 468 million. The first—and, to date, the only—official Communist census, dated June 30, 1953, disclosed a figure of 582.6 million.² To be sure, Western demographers have questioned the reliability of the census in view of its assumptions and the manner in which it was conducted, yet since we have very little in-

¹ W. K., "Communist China's Agricultural Calamities," *The China Quarterly*, No. 6, April-June, 1961, p. 69.

² U.S. Bureau of the Census. *The Size, Composition, and Growth of the Population of Mainland China*, by John S. Aird, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 15, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1961, pp. 1-5. See also his "The Present and Prospective Population of Mainland China," in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R. and Mainland China*, New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1960, pp. 93-133.

formation beyond what Peking has made available, we are compelled, at least, to fall back upon the 1953 census as a starting point.

If we accept the census figure of 582.6 million, and a given birth rate of 37/1000 and a death rate of 17/1000, together yielding a natural increase of two per cent per year, we are led to a 1962 population totaling 690 million. In other words, if these estimates and calculations have any validity, we must assume that the Chinese People's Republic today contains about one-fourth of the world's inhabitants. If growth continues at the given rate, within two decades the Republic's population will pass the billion mark!

On the other hand, according to available non-Communist assessments, an unusually small proportion of Peking's domain is suitable for cultivation. Geographers tell us that 69 per cent of the entire country consists of high mountains, plateaus and hills, whereas the remainder includes plains, basins and lowlands. But much of the latter is not suitable for crops. In fact, only one-tenth of the mainland may be deemed arable, amounting to about 270 million acres, presently under cultivation.³

If this area were distributed more equally over the vast republic, the man-arable land ratio might seem less acute than it does. In reality, most of the 270 million acres are to be found in eastern China, that is, to the east of a line which may be drawn from the Amur River in northwestern Heilungkiang Province to the southern border of south-

western Yunnan Province. To the west of the line lie the dry uplands and interior desert basins of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and northwest China Proper. Basically, the "west" is a colonial land, sparsely inhabited by non-Sinic people, practicing pastoral nomadism or, wherever water is available, engaged in irrigation agriculture. Only along the Kansu Corridor has Chinese settlement pushed deeply into these arid regions.

To the east of the line where most of the cultivation occurs, not all of the arable land may be considered good. For topographic and pedologic reasons, only 30 per cent of the area is superior; 40 per cent is of medium quality, while the rest is distinctly marginal.⁴ Moreover, north of the Yangtze, precipitation is not always sufficient or reliable.

Nevertheless, it is the arable "east" that sustains over 80 per cent of the mainland's population, giving rise, as any dot map of population will show, to enormous rural densities.⁵ In certain select areas, as for example in Szechwan Province, the density may reach 2,500 persons per square mile. Moreover, as a result of the continued rural population increase, by 1957 there were slightly more than two rural inhabitants per area of cultivated land, whereas five years earlier there had been 1.87.

The "east," too, contains the great cities of China, whose population was greatly augmented during the early years of Communist power when millions of peasants fled from the countryside. According to the 1953 census, China's cities then contained 77 million or about 13 per cent of the total.⁶ Today, the population of the cities may have reached 90 million or more.⁷ What this means in absolute terms is that the Chinese mainland has the largest urban population in the world outside the United States and the U.S.S.R. And it must be fed by a peasantry scarcely able to provide for itself.

The fact that the bulk of the people live under conditions of colossal crowding reflects basic facts of China's geography as well as certain features of Chinese society. China's peasants obtain much of their food directly from the land through their own efforts.

³ Ralph W. Phillips and Leslie T. C. Kuo, "Agricultural Development in Communist China," *International Development Review*, Vol. III, No. 1, Feb., 1961, pp. 19-23.

⁴ Valentin Chu, "The Famine Makers: A Report on Why China is Starving," *The New Leader*, June 11, 1962, p. 13.


⁵ Leo A. Orleans, "Population Redistribution in Communist China," in *Population Trends in Eastern Europe, The U.S.S.R. and Mainland China*, pp. 141-150.

⁶ U.S. Bureau of the Census. *Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958*, by Morris B. Ullman, International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 59, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., 1961, pp. 6, 12-14.

⁷ Leo A. Orleans, "The Recent Growth of China's Urban Population," *The Geographical Review*, January, 1959, pp. 43-59.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF CHINA

EACH DOT REPRESENTS 5,000 PERSONS



Specializing in the production of cereals, principally rice and wheat, tubers and vegetables, they depend heavily on a vegetarian diet. Livestock play an unimportant role. Because the patterns of agriculture have been established for centuries, and have nurtured the mushrooming densities referred to above, the latter in turn make it next to impossible to diversify freely. Thus, any attempt by man to alter the seasonal rhythm of farm life which will disturb the delicate man-land balance—and, of course, nature has frequently tipped the balance against the peasant—can have immediate and serious repercussions. Such a reaction is all the more acute when 12 to 15 million additional mouths have to be fed every year.

When natural calamities are at a minimum, China's total food output, (which, it must be recalled, entails double and some triple cropping in southeast China), may be sufficient to keep the people alive. Moreover, under the Communist regime, the cultivated area has been increased generally beyond pre-revolutionary levels, providing, it is assumed, larger total harvests. Until 1958 at least, the rate of growth of the economy as a whole was quite high, estimated at from six to seven per cent, which was more than twice the annual population increase. However, the establishment of rural communes in 1958 brought this progress to a halt and made a fiction of the "great leap forward."

The consequences for Chinese agriculture were most disastrous. The fact that the farm land affected by natural disasters rose from 13 million acres in 1950, to 78 million in 1958, to 148 million (out of the 270 million acres cultivated) in 1960, has led one writer to claim that China now faces "a nation-wide exhaustion of the land and the people."⁸

⁸ Chu, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁹ Kingsley Davis, "The Political Impact of New Population Trends," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1958, p. 293. See also: Leo A. Orleans, "Birth Control: Reversal or Postponement?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 3, July-Sept., 1960, pp. 59-70.

¹⁰ Quoted in *Hsin Chien-she* (New Construction), No. 5, Peking, May, 1960, pp. 1-13.

¹¹ Quoted in the *Seattle Times*, May 31, 1962.

The consequent decline in output, accompanied by the continued population increase, along with weaknesses in the food distribution system—a chronic problem in every Communist country where agriculture has been collectivized—together mean that Peking cannot provide for all its people. For this reason, in recent months large purchases of grain have had to be made abroad; notably from Canada and Australia. But what of the future?

In view of the seriousness of the situation, what alternatives confront the Communist regime? Since agriculture is the foundation of China's economy, its weakness or deterioration can undermine the whole effort to develop the industrial sector. Agricultural production must be adequate to support a rapidly growing population; failing this, some way must be found to control or reduce the high natural population increase.

The traditional official Communist line with respect to population has claimed that overpopulation is a myth generated by Malthusian reactionaries to conceal the true cause of human misery, namely capitalism.⁹ And Friedrich Engels is quoted as saying: "If Malthus had not considered the matter so one-sidedly, he could not have failed to see that surplus population or labor is invariably tied up with surplus wealth, surplus capital, and surplus landed property."¹⁰

In spite of theory, in 1957-1958 Peking abruptly reversed its previous policy of encouraging population growth and carried out an active campaign against high birth rates in newspaper editorials. However, when the communes had been established, by mid-1958, the emphasis in policy statements once again reflected the orthodox line. A severe manpower shortage was proclaimed in the countryside, with an official campaign to mobilize every available pair of hands. Within the past few months, the campaign against high birth rates has been stepped up, with *The China Youth News* warning against early marriages, the reason given being the health of the individual Chinese.¹¹

In spite of these attempts to control the high rate of natural increase, the mainland's population will in all probability continue

its surge upward. While the decline in the mortality rate may, in the future, be less than over the past decade, even allowing for the continued improvement in personal hygiene and in the system of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries established throughout the country, it is to be expected, because of the cost and difficulties inherent in educating such an enormous population, that a high rate of birth will prevail. Not even a decreasing standard or worsening conditions of life may alter this fact significantly. Moreover, experience in Japan shows that birth control measures among the peasantry have only limited effect; the real cause in reducing the number of births was abortion and sterilization, which Peking has not widely encouraged or made possible.

For the most part, China's crop yields, despite its intensive agriculture, have not been high compared with those, for example, of Japan. Although the Peking regime has attempted to increase yields, by expanding the area under irrigation, through heavier fertilization, greater mechanization, and other agronomic reforms, no substantial progress seems to have been made. Furthermore, judging by the unhappy Soviet experience, one cannot assume that the Chinese will in future be more successful in collectivized agriculture than their Russian partners.

The Soviets, of course, have found the expansion of the cultivated area to be of more immediate value, although much of the expansion has occurred in marginal areas. The possibilities of bringing significantly more land under crops in China, however, seem even more remote. To be sure, Communist estimates of the arable potential range up to 250 million acres of virgin land which, if cultivated, would mean a doubling of the present crop area. However, east of the Heilungkiang-Yunnan line, most of the available arable land has already been utilized, save in northern Heilungkiang. But, even there extensive reclamation is required before the

wet soils along the Amur can be fully utilized, while an ever present inhibiting factor is the short growing season.

On the other hand, the geographic conditions in the arid west can hardly support any optimism over its agricultural potential. While reclamation projects making possible some increase in crop acreage in eastern Inner Mongolia, along the Manass River and elsewhere in Sinkiang, as well as in parts of Tibet, may make important changes in the local economy of these vast, little-developed areas, yet the numbers of Chinese that they will draw from China Proper will scarcely affect the over-crowded lands. At any rate had these remote provinces proved attractive to Chinese colonization and settlement in the past, they would undoubtedly have had a denser Chinese population today.

Unable within the foreseeable future to control births at home, hampered in their efforts to increase domestic output of food without sizeable investments, and unwilling, from an ideological and political-economic point of view, to continue large purchases of grain abroad, the Chinese Communists, it is frequently stated in the West, will be compelled to find foreign outlets for their surplus population. Indeed, one writer, some years ago, went so far as to predict, for example, that conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China is inevitable because of the latter's demographic problem. In 1953, Wilhelm Starlinger, a German doctor, emerged after five years in a Soviet concentration camp, convinced that China would be compelled to move into Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) and into eastern Siberia, territories which had in the past been under the dominion of the emperor of China.¹²

Starlinger's conclusions were based on superficial evidence, but on publication they had a considerable impact on geopolitical thinking in both France and West Germany. While both Outer Mongolia and eastern Siberia are sparsely occupied, their population-carrying capacity, in terms of crop cultivation, is not great. In Siberia, as in northern Heilungkiang, poor soils and a short growing

¹² John E. Tashjian, *Where China Meets Russia: An Analysis of Dr. Starlinger's Theory*. Central Asian Collectanea, No. 2, Washington, D. C., 1959, pp. 69.

season impose severe limits, while in Outer Mongolia for the most part, successful crop cultivation depends to an important degree on irrigation, and the potential is low.

Starlinger's hypothesis has, in somewhat altered form, appeared in the writings of the noted correspondent for *The New York Times*, Harrison Salisbury. "For it is perfectly apparent," he has stated.¹³

to anyone who reads the statistics [i.e., of China's population growth], that [there] . . . are . . . going to be heavy and continuous population pressures on those great vacant lands of Russia's to the East (lands, incidentally, which in most cases were at one time the property of China). . . .

Salisbury accordingly explained the Khrushchev virgin and idle land program, which, after 1954, resulted in the ploughing of more than 70 million acres of little used or unused land in western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan and the settlement there of several hundred thousand Russian and Ukrainians, as proof of Soviet concern for its empty Siberian lands. The Khrushchev program unquestionably had political overtones, but more convincing reasons for its implementation may be found in the domestic food situation in the U.S.S.R. than in the eventual spillover of Chinese into Siberia.

In any case, the arguments of both Starlinger and Salisbury are unsound, according to Karl August Wittfogel.¹⁴ The thesis of neither man, he points out, takes into consideration the true effect of collectivization on the Chinese peasantry. China does not have a problem of surplus population, says Wittfogel, but rather suffers a shortage of labor in the countryside, which is likely to persist during the next "historical" period. Hence, rather than seek outlets in Siberia and

Outer Mongolia for its population, Peking will be compelled to seek a solution in increased productivity on the communes.

The reorganization of the countryside may, to be sure, as both Wittfogel and the Chinese Communists claim, have created labor shortages, but neither have demonstrated adequately how productivity on Chinese farms is to be raised within the immediate future. Most of the available evidence points, rather, to a continued intensification of the food supply problem. However, before leaving the "outlet to the north" theory, a note should be added, perhaps, concerning Outer Mongolia. A part of the Ch'ing empire until the latter's demise in 1911, Outer Mongolia has been in effect a satellite of the Soviet Union since 1921. Never accepted as a separate entity by the Chinese Nationalists, the republic, nevertheless, was accorded recognition by the Chinese Communists in 1950. Since then, Peking has granted economic assistance to Ulan Bator, which indeed, in 1955, (later renewed in 1960) made arrangements whereby Chinese labor could migrate under contract to Outer Mongolia.

This interest in and assistance by Peking in the development of the Outer Mongolian republic's economy, including the development of irrigation facilities along the Orkhon, has led Western observers to conclude that the Chinese plan to challenge Soviet hegemony there.

If the Chinese regime does recognize that the lands to the north, in Outer Mongolia and Siberia, offer no possibility for Chinese settlement,¹⁵ what then of the lands to the south in the peninsular and insular regions of southeast Asia? The geographer, Herold Wiens,¹⁶ has already noted the historic psy-

(Continued on page 181)

¹³ Harrison E. Salisbury, *To Moscow—and Beyond*, New York: Harper & Bros., 1959, p. 249.

¹⁴ Karl A. Wittfogel, "Demography," in *Bear and Dragon: What is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?*, ed. by James Burnham, published by National Review, Inc., New York, 1960, pp. 33-36.

¹⁵ It is worth noting, too, in this connection that cartographic discrepancies occur, between Soviet and Chinese Communist maps, over the Chinese-Mongolian boundary as well as over the boundary between eastern Siberia and northern Inner Mongolia in the neighborhood of Manchouli.

¹⁶ Herold J. Wiens, *China's March Toward the Tropics*. Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, 1954.

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Analyzing Communist China's farm underproduction, its causes and effects, this specialist observes that "Once the decline in agricultural production had started and hard work had driven the peasants to exhaustion, physical debility . . . began to compound the difficulties. . . . Seeds were depleted; crop land fell into disuse; the real crisis was thus in the making."

Farm Crisis in Red China

By YUAN-LI WU

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EVEN THE most casual observer of events in Communist-controlled countries cannot fail to notice the apparent inability of these regimes to develop agricultural production as rapidly and on as vast a scale as they have been able to promote industrial development and to garner industrial power for military use. Reports from Communist China during the last decade have offered little exception to this rule even though, for a time, the establishment of the communes in 1958 was accompanied by frequent and fervent reports of exceptional crops so that both the Communist authorities themselves and many in the outside world were astounded, the former by their apparently good fortune, the latter by the inexplicability from the purely technical view of the reported general increases in yield. Since then, the general public in the West has read occasional reports of severe food shortages in mainland China, of Communist trade emissaries purchasing food from Canada and Australia and even making discreet inquiries regarding possible supplies from the United States, and of suggestions from United States citizens that we send food to Communist China. On the basis of these separate pieces of information one conjures up in one's mind a picture of famine, pestilence and despair, which together point to a greatly weakened Communist regime in China.

Lagging agricultural production, noted al-

ready during the First Five Year Plan (1953-1957), was to a large extent a result of deliberate Communist policy, and should not therefore be regarded as synonymous with serious agricultural difficulties. Nor is the mere act of importation of food necessarily a sign of inadequate supply. That Communist China has been confronted with more than ordinary agricultural lags and difficulties becomes indisputable only when we consider several major symptoms and what they must signify *in toto*. The following are among the principal points to be noted:

First, although there is no immutable logic why any nation should be able to feed itself entirely with its own produce, Communist China has always made it a matter of Party policy to be self-sufficient in food. This policy of *autarky* was pursued unwaveringly and with a considerable measure of success until late 1960 when the decision to purchase foreign cereals for domestic consumption, as distinct from re-export, was made. Reversal of this policy of long standing was obviously not taken lightly.

Second, short rations are not uncommon in an underdeveloped country, and are to be expected in cases where forced savings are needed to support a high rate of capital formation or other large public expenditures. However, drastic cuts of rations are of a different order. According to official regulations, monthly grain rations in Communist China

in 1955 were fixed at 16.75 kilograms for a person doing light work in rice-eating and wheat flour-eating regions, and 21 kilograms for a person doing heavy work.¹ In comparison, the median of rations received by the most favored group of urban workers in 23 reported cases in early 1962 was only 17.5 kilograms of milled grain.² The rest of the urban population received considerably less, ranging from 10 to 12.5 kilograms.

In the rural areas, rations also vary with the class of labor to which the individual belongs; there are, in addition, wide regional variations. In general, however, the amount tends to be smaller than the urban rations. The above figures reflect serious cuts from the 1955 level when the rations were approximately adequate to provide for the minimum caloric intake of the average adult Chinese.³ To cut the 1955 ration level by some 15–40 per cent,⁴ for instance, would have a detrimental effect on health and would approximate slow starvation. The even lower rations accorded those in the rural area who cannot work and who therefore contribute nothing to production have of course an even more pronounced effect and may lead to outright starvation. These ration reports constitute another incontrovertible evidence of the dimensions of the agricultural crisis in Communist China.

¹ See "Chugoku no Shokuryo Jiro," *Ajia Keizai Junpo*, Tokyo, November 20, 1960, pp. 1–10.

² Original data based on information obtained from interviews in a recent trip by the author to the Far East.

³ Computed on the basis of a national mean of 245 kilograms of "trade" or roughly milled grain per annum per adult, equivalent to approximately 285 kilograms of unprocessed grain or 2,200 calories a day. If 90 per cent of total caloric intake is derived from these staples, the total daily intake would be 2,400 calories, which is about the minimum required by a Chinese adult male weighing 55 kilograms.

⁴ Reduction from 245 kilograms a year to 210–150 kilograms (i.e., 17.5–12.5 kgs. a month) would be roughly a 15 to 40 per cent cut.

⁵ Adjusted estimate of imported cereals in 1961, excluding re-exports to Albania, Burma, and East Germany, based on Allan J. Barry, "The Chinese Food Purchases," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, October 12, 1961.

⁶ See *Kung-sheung Ya-pao*, Hongkong, January 15, 1962, and *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, May 17, 1962. The 1962 annual rate is based on reports for the first four months.

Third, in view of the large Chinese population—probably over 700 million in 1962—even an import of 5 million tons of food⁵ would only average 7 kilograms per person per year. Communist China's food imports during 1961 were made at a cost of some \$230 million of payment in foreign exchange during the year—an amount which would be entirely out of proportion to any marginal benefit that would accrue to the individual consumer if the imports were distributed evenly in the entire country. The obvious explanation lies in the fact that they were, and probably still are, destined for certain groups of consumers only, notably consumers in major cities and the armed forces. However, the very need to provide for these consumers through import is testimony to the severity of disruptions of the grain collection and distribution system, one probable cause of which would be critical shortage in the producing areas.

Fourth, local food shortages in various regions of the country have apparently led to large population shifts, both under a general policy to transfer many city residents to the country to help in food production and to ease the urban distribution problem, and as a result of uncontrolled population movements from one place to another in search of food. The ranks of the refugees who fled to Hong Kong in large numbers in May, 1962, were swollen by migrants of the same type; this again points to breakdown of the distribution system. Apparently, production shortfalls have been compounded by maldistribution and inadequate control over existing stocks.

Lastly, in response to appeals for food from relatives and friends in Communist China, the number of food packages sent through the regular mail from Hong Kong has mounted steadily since 1960, rising from 870,000 in 1959 to 4 million in 1960, 13 million in 1961 and an annual rate exceeding 14 million in 1962.⁶

DECLINE OF GRAIN PRODUCTION

So far, attention has been focused primarily on the symptoms of food shortage, inasmuch as lack of food constitutes the core of the agricultural difficulties. Within the general

category of food, the basic items are cereals and potatoes which, subsumed under the generic term, "grain," constitute the principal sources of carbohydrates that must supply 85 to 90 per cent of the total caloric intake in the Chinese diet today.

In considering the level of grain production in Communist China in recent years, one must face the problem of data shortage. Ever since the downward revision of the 1958 crop, undertaken in 1959, from the level of 375 million tons given in 1958 to 250 million tons, no official statistics have been published as yet on actual production in 1959–1961. Only the vaguest references have been given so far, such as a second-hand report by Montgomery to the effect that Chinese grain production in 1960 was 150 million tons.⁷ Because of the absence of reliable statistics, a proliferation of estimates is now available for those who wish to look more closely into the subject.⁸

The consensus, however, seems clear. To wit: the actual harvest in 1958 was considerably less than the revised figure of 250 million tons given out in 1959; the 1959 harvest of which the last published, revised target was 270 million tons was probably less than the actual harvest of 1958 because of especially poor fall crops; the 1960 harvest was even smaller than that of 1959; the 1961 harvest may have been slightly higher than that of 1960. Finally, the 1962 harvest may have a target of 160–170 million tons. Perhaps the worst harvest occurred in 1960 when production fell to a level varying estimated from as

low as a little over 100 million tons to the relatively respectable level of 160 million tons, while the truth may lie in between.⁹

A point to bear in mind is that out of any given gross output, allowance must be made for waste and such uses as seed, feed, and raw materials in manufacturing so that, as a rule of thumb, not more than 80 per cent would remain for direct human consumption as food. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the current year's output would actually be 170 million tons of unprocessed grain, only 136 million tons would be available for direct consumption as food in 1963. On the other hand, at the 1955 ration base, total demand would be in the neighborhood of 179 million tons.¹⁰ The shortage would amount to 43 million tons or nearly 31.6 per cent of the estimated supply level. In other words, roughly a 30 per cent reduction of the consumption level would be needed to make ends meet. The result would not constitute a caloric intake that could be sustained long.¹¹

EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS

The agricultural crisis has of course gone beyond the shortage of cereals and potatoes. Edible oils and pork, the principal kind of meat in the Chinese diet, have long been short. Rations of oil in cities in 1962 have been reported at from 2 to 2.5 ounces per person for the more favored group of employed workers. Meat rations seem to have disappeared completely in some instances except on national holidays. One report from Shanghai where food supplies had on the whole been relatively less strained stated that there was no pork ration available altogether during the winter of 1961–1962 and that in its place one-half catty (one-fourth of a kilogram) of fish could be obtained every ten days by the ordinary resident.

Lack of uniformity in the rationing system from one area to another, purposeful discrimination against certain groups and in favor of others, and continual change even in the same area—all of which are reflections both of conscious policy and of breakdowns in the distribution system—preclude a hard and fast generalization that would be valid for

⁷ *The Sunday Times*, Magazine Section, October 15, 1961.

⁸ Cf. for instance, *Tsu-kuo* (China Weekly), Vol. XXXIII, No. 7, 1961; *Chin-jih Shih-chieh* (Today's World), No. 235 and 241, Hong Kong, 1962; and Philip P. Jones and Thomas T. Poleman, "Communes and the Agricultural Crisis," *Food Research Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 1, Stanford, February, 1962.

⁹ These observations are based in part upon interviews the author had with specialists in Chinese studies in the Far East.

¹⁰ Computed on the basis of 285 kgs. of unprocessed grain per adult and a population of 727 million by the end of 1962, approximately equivalent to 625 million adults.

¹¹ This would yield a daily caloric intake of 1,540 from cereals and potatoes for an adult and a total intake that would probably be around 1,700 calories.

the country as a whole. However, authenticated travelers' reports on which some of the preceding statements have been based do permit a reasonably reliable assessment of the general nature of the crisis, extending definitely to the supply of fats and oils and animal proteins. Shortage in these particular categories has in turn accentuated the impact of the deficiency in grain supply.

Since many agricultural products constitute the raw materials of consumers' goods industries—cotton textiles, for instance—the agricultural crisis made its effect felt in industrial production even before the conscious shift of official policy in 1961 to try to build up agriculture at the expense of industry. The consensus among many students in Japan and Taiwan is that production of consumers' goods had begun to decline in 1960 as a result of crop failures, at least in the second half of 1959, even though the total industrial output of 1960 may have continued to rise because of the growth of the capital goods industries. There is, on the other hand, little doubt that industrial production as a whole began to decline during 1961 and that the drop has so far continued in 1962. Population movements from urban to rural areas, including shifts of industrial workers to aid farm production, have in turn contributed to the decline of industrial output even though lack of raw materials, equipment and spare parts may have acted as the primary cause.

Production declines in agriculture and in the manufacture of consumers' goods have in turn affected the volume of exports of which primary and processed farm products are a major part. Reports are available on the decline of Chinese exports to the Soviet Union and the related problem of debt settlement between the two countries.¹² The same applies to Chinese trade with the rest of the world. In the latest trade protocol between Communist China and the Soviet Union,

signed in May, 1962, grains were conspicuously absent among the principal Chinese exports.¹³ All this is not to say that food exports from Communist China have ceased. Re-export of rice and wheat purchased from Burma and Canada has continued while soybean exports to Japan during 1961 remained at a high level. However, the overall decline of exports is indisputable, thus coinciding with a rising demand for imported food.

The squeeze on the country's foreign exchange position has in turn brought about disinvestment of foreign assets, such as sale of silver holdings, and curtailment of other imports. Since Communist China's foreign exchange holdings were not very large to start with, any substantial disinvestment would have a telling effect on maneuverability in future foreign economic negotiations and in the country's ability to withstand further economic shocks.

As for the curtailment of imports, it can hardly take place without a noticeable effect on imported supplies of industrial raw materials and equipment inasmuch as import of "non-essential" consumers' goods has long been discontinued under the austerity program of the past decade. It will be recalled that coinciding with and, in some instances, perhaps even antedating the onset of the present agricultural crisis in 1959–1960, the scale of Soviet technical assistance in various construction projects was reduced; shipment of Soviet equipment to Communist China has apparently also been subject to delays. Unless the scale of Soviet assistance is stepped up, the balance of payments squeeze noted above cannot but be felt all the more painfully.

Apart from the foreign exchange problem in general, the decline of exports has weakened Communist China's bid for economic dominance in Southeast Asia where economic warfare practices were actively pursued toward the end of the First Five Year Plan¹⁴ and inroads had been made even against Japanese competition.

Even though the size of food rations has been geared to the value of the individual to the state as a worker and a loyal subject,

¹² See *Vneshnaia Torgovlia* (Foreign Trade), Moscow, May, 1961.

¹³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 8, May 24, 1962, p. 359.

¹⁴ See Albert Ravenholt, *The Human Price of China's Disastrous Food Shortage*, American Universities Field Staff Reports, May, 1962.

it is doubtful that privations can be restricted wholly to selected groups of the population. Human nature, the Chinese family system and lingering traditional values all conspire against the prospect of success for any policy of "selective starvation" that might be attempted. The result therefore is a deterioration of health that is far more widespread than it might have been and, with this development, a decline of labor productivity that goes beyond any unwillingness to work hard. The rise of debilitating diseases due to nutritional deficiencies provides ample evidence in this respect.

Poor crops, dislocation through population movement, industrial cutbacks, the uncertain prospects of foreign aid, the balance of payments squeeze, reduced rations, poor health, and lowered productivity all add up to a general and precipitous decline of the economy. The cumulative effect of the decline has now replaced the impetus of the upswing during the First Five Year Plan so that the critical question today is whether this movement will continue to spiral downward or succeed in "bottoming out" eventually to reach a turning point. The nature and efficacy of the corrective measures that have been or may yet be undertaken will have a determining effect.

POLITICAL EFFECTS

However, before the prospects of economic recovery from the present crisis can be discussed meaningfully, one must adopt as an analytical working hypothesis that the political strains and deterioration of control by the Communist party, both aggravated and revealed by its economic crisis, will not develop such proportions as to bring about a radical political upheaval in Communist China, that is, in the absence of any external intervention.

Any attempt to enumerate the more obvious effects that can be noted so far would include the following: First, the privations suffered by the population provide ample evidence of defects in the economic plans and their incompetent implementation. The Chinese Communist party has always taken pride in

its "expertise" in dealing with the peasantry. Monumental errors of judgment that have now been revealed weaken popular confidence in the wisdom and ability of the leadership. Second, internal dissension among Communist party members must now be taken more seriously by the leadership while loyalty on the part of the regular armed forces and the security police can no longer be taken completely for granted. Loosening of the tight grip of administrative and Party control, as partly revealed by internal, unplanned population movements and the refugee flights to Hong Kong in May, 1962, may well mark the beginning of a more serious breakdown.

Third, in these circumstances, food riots assume more menacing colors in the eyes of the regime while uprisings of larger proportions are no longer unrealistic threats. Fourth, the downward spiralling of the agricultural and economic difficulties has shown to both the Chinese and the outside world that Soviet aid and support have not been forthcoming at critical moments to stem the tide, quite apart from the thought that their anticipated reduction during the Second Five Year Plan may have contributed to the adoption of policies in 1958 that triggered the downturn. Fifth, all this adds up to the background against which the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan cannot but feel more hopeful for an eventual return to the mainland while the Communists, being even more aware of their own difficulties, have in response betrayed a nervousness that they have sought to conceal through "bluff and bluster." Yet any intensification of military preparations with their consequent diversion of resources from economic recovery efforts would only retard the recovery and worsen the crisis.

CAUSES OF THE CRISIS

Many factors were responsible for the onset of the agricultural crisis. These may be divided into three groups of primary causes: (1) adoption of production methods not adapted to local and specific conditions, such as deep plowing, close planting and improper irrigation; (2) faulty management that, partly through ignorance and partly through over-

centralization, abused the labor mobility which, through the establishment of the communes, could have been an advantage in economic planning; (3) destruction of incentive through the organization of communal mess halls, disruption of family life, confiscation and abolition of all private property and individual productive activities, and divorce of earnings from the amount of hard work done—all these being essential parts of the commune system. These causes may be further summarized as technical ignorance, poor economics, and unwise political judgment. Unfavorable weather conditions probably did not help, but they were only “accessories after the fact.”

Once the decline in agricultural production had started and hard work had driven the peasants to exhaustion, physical debility and deterioration of health began to compound the difficulties. Sheer neglect and the negative effects of some of the measures improperly introduced to increase production, such as alkalization of the soil through inadequate irrigation measures, caught up with the process of contraction. Seeds were depleted; crop land fell into disuse;¹⁵ the real crisis was thus in the making. Such, briefly, has been the process of contraction generated by the communes and the “Great Leap” of 1958–1959.

The corrective measures announced in 1961¹⁶ and re-confirmed in 1962 in the long postponed National People’s Congress are aimed at the primary causes of the crisis. Their intent is clearly twofold: (1) elimination of the errors in management through decentralization, shift of operational responsibility to the production brigades and teams, and limitation of the power of the commune to direct labor movement and (2) restoration of private incentive through permission for private plots, limited activity on free markets and closer ties between productivity and the level of compensation.

¹⁵ See Y. L. Wu, “Peking’s Economic Strategy in Asia,” *Problems of Communism*, Washington, D. C., January–February, 1960.

¹⁶ See, for instance, a report of the Communist China News Service, April 25, 1962, on the difficulties in bringing under cultivation some of the land previously affected by flood in Shantung.

There is no question that these measures are aimed in the right direction as a means to bring about economic recovery. Unfortunately for the Communists, it does not follow that they are sufficient, even though they may be necessary, conditions of recovery.

First, one may raise the question whether the degree of relaxation of central control and state ownership now permitted is sufficient to improve efficiency and incentive. In other words, have the Communists gone far enough? Second, in regard to incentive, there is the question whether official promises that a greater part of the produce can now be retained by the individual farmers will be believed. Third, consumption and deterioration of both human and material capital in the farm economy cannot be restored through an about-face in policy. Physical fitness must be restored. Land that has fallen into disuse must be brought under proper cultivation once more. Seeds, grain stocks and draught animals must be replenished.

In other words, restoration of production is contingent upon making good the previous disinvestment. The process will take time and may well absorb any initial increase in production. Lastly, it is necessary to point out that restoration of agricultural production to the level reached before the downturn would not be sufficient, because the desperate measures introduced in 1958 were in part induced by dissatisfaction with performance in the agricultural sector. However, the conditions for a more rapid growth, such as a larger supply of chemical fertilizers, would not be automatically improved as a result of these corrective measures.

(Continued on page 182)

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"The Chinese Communist party's complete control over the Government is perhaps the most amazing phenomenon in modern totalitarian politics," writes this specialist, who notes that "the rise of a new center of power, attraction and leadership in the bloc bespeaks the unmistakable enhancement of the international stature and security of the C.C.P."

Party Rule in Communist China¹

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"CHINA is a country of 500,000,000 slaves ruled by a single god and nine million puritans," said Chang Po-chün, a ranking member of the China Democratic League serving as Minister of Communications in the Peking regime during the "blooming" and "contending" movement in 1957.² This statement at once reveals both the bitter grudge he felt toward the leader and members of the C.C.P. (Chinese Communist party), and the scrupulous efficiency, devotion, and monopolist domination with which the Party has run the country, despite failures, resistance and desertion.

The "god," of course, refers to Mao Tse-tung; and the "puritans," to his faithful followers in the party. Today, the number of "slaves" has swollen to somewhere between 650 and 700 million, and the "puritans" have also nearly doubled their ranks.

¹ The author acknowledges the assistance he has received in preparing this study from his wife, Wei-ling, Instructor at the University Library.

² Quoted in William Stevenson, *The Yellow Wind*, Boston, H. Mifflin, 1959, front page preceeding the Table of Contents.

³ According to Party historian Hu Ch'iao-mu, Party membership jumped from 900 to 57,900 that year; the Party itself hence changed from a "study club" into a popular movement. See his *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1959 ed., p. 16.

⁴ Address at the Meeting in Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961, p. 5.

The C.C.P. started in 1921 with not more than 50 members, none of them "puritan." Only after 1925 did it start to acquire a limited mass following in China.³ By 1935, it was on the verge of total ruin in the face of "Extermination Campaigns" conducted by the K.M.T. (Kuo-min-tang). But at this juncture, Mao Tse-tung took control, faring through the rough and now legendary Long March to the Yen-an area from Kiangsi, where initial soviet experiments vanished. Rising in caves and barren fields remote from the coastal centers of agricultural productivity, commercial prosperity and political authority, the Party, under shrewd and determined leadership, was aided by the subsequent war of resistance against Japanese aggression and by the resultant alliance with the K.M.T. By 1945, the Party ranks had swelled to 1,210,000, from no more than 20,000 survivors ten years before. At the Seventh Congress convened in Yen-an that year, a new Party Constitution accepted "the teachings which unite the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution—the Thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the blueprint to guide "its entire work."⁴

In terms of Party expansion alone, the result of the "people's war of liberation" of 1945–1949 was spectacular enough: on accession to power, Communists numbered 4,500,000, organized into some 250,000 basic

units which then took up strategic positions throughout the nation to serve as the nuclei of the poignant land reform and other mass movements soon to begin. By the time of its thirtieth anniversary (1951), the C.C.P. consisted of 5,800,000 members, marking a rather modest increase during these early years as the ruling Party. But the ten million milestone was soon reached in 1956, at the convening of its Eighth Congress; and three years later, when the P.R.C. (People's Republic of China) celebrated its tenth anniversary, Party membership reached nearly 14 million, having apparently absorbed a large new "construction" crop of "cadres" through the completion of its First, and the beginning of its Second, Five Year Plan. By its fortieth anniversary (1961), the Party had "more than 17 million members," organized into over 1,000,000 basic units.⁵

After 28 years of "democratic revolution" (1921–1949)—so goes the official interpretation—4 years of "transition" (1949–1953),

5 years of "socialist revolution and socialist transformation" (that is, First Five-Year Plan, 1953–1957), and 5 years of initial "socialist construction" (i.e., Second Five-Year Plan, 1958–1962), the Party has now attained its "political maturity."⁶

LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY

"There is surely no need to stress the pre-eminent role that Mao Tse-tung has played in the Chinese Communist movement during the past quarter of a century," it has been observed. "He has been the Chinese analogue of both Lenin and Stalin."⁷ It might be added that the Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism as he has interpreted and assimilated it stands as the only kind of communism most likely known to the Party membership at large, especially to the 16,000,000 who joined after 1945, or at least the more than 12,500,000 who joined after 1949. Mao's doctrine is perhaps held by them and perhaps even by large segments of their fellow countrymen⁸ especially dear today.

Ever since 1941–1942, Mao's ideas as expressed in his speeches and writings have been employed as means of "rectification" within the Party. The 1956 Party Constitution, the new one, retained Maoism implicitly as the guiding ideology by definition, that is, in terms of "the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of China's revolutionary struggle." And it was added that the Party would combat "all doctrinaire or empiricist deviations."

The "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" has permeated C.C.P. ranks extensively through repeated "rectification" campaigns and "study" movements; it has become too conspicuous, or even influential, in the international Communist movement to be overlooked. If it might not sound fully creditable that Mao believes that, in apostolic succession, he is the direct heir to Lenin,⁹ it might at least be said that Maoism, too, has achieved a measure of "maturity," secure and well adjusted to China's traditional environment and recognized internationally.¹⁰

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13. Cf. Liu Lan-t'ao, "The Communist Party of China Is the High Command of the Chinese People in Building Socialism," *Ten Glorious Years*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960, pp. 283ff.

⁶ An editorial of the *People's Daily*, Peking, July 1, 1961, as appended in Liu Shao-ch'i's *Address*, cited above, p. 36.

⁷ Harold C. Hinton, "The Succession Problem in Communist China," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), July 19, 1961, p. 2.

⁸ See the testimony by an escapee from the China mainland on the "odd" pride felt by people during the Sino-Soviet doctrinal dispute that "Mao Tse-tung had learnt so much about Marxism and Leninism that he should be the leading Communist rather than Khrushchev, at least in the field of Communist ideology"; and also the testimony of another young escapee on his "respect" for Mao; in "Interview with a Translator from Shanghai" and "Who Is Mao Tse-tung?: Four Answers" in *Current Scene*, July 10, 1961, p. 7, and January 5, 1962, p. 9 respectively.

⁹ Richard Hughes, "The Duel of Communism's Big Two," *New York Times Magazine*, April 1, 1962, p. 116.

¹⁰ See this writer's article "Chinese Communist Ideology" in the January 1957 issue of this journal. Cf. *Union Research Service*, Vol. 21, Nos. 7–8, and Vol. 25, Nos. 7–9, "On Confucius" and "More on Confucius." Cf. also Max Frankel, "Whose Communism's Better, Comrade?" *New York Times Book Review*, March 4, 1962, and discussion below on the CCP's international status.

But Mao and his ideology also symbolize the unity and maturity of the Party leadership as a whole. The 190-odd members of the C.C.P.'s Central Committee have contributed most of their lifetime's work to the revolutionary movement in association with Mao from Kiangsi and Yenan days, with the 25-man Politburo and its seven-man Standing Committee representing the "power locus" of the whole rank and file. Rumors of "power struggle" within the top echelon have at times been rampant, of course, but the relative absence of violent, or at least public, "purges" has generally reinforced the impression of comradeship and stability. In terms of intra-Party "controversies," they have been openly admitted without any visible sense of guilt.¹¹

Although still reported vigorous, Mao is known to have designated Liu Shao-ch'i, currently Chairman of the P.R.C., as his heir to head the Party. Liu's coming to the fore has been due, according to an earnest study, to his "ability," "discipline," and "close relations" with Mao as the Party's "organization man: a methodical, patient, painstaking in-

dividual who has not only survived but risen to the top echelon of command through merging his individual aspirations with the larger demands of the revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," and whose "forte has been as master of the theory of mass psychology and the practice of mass organization for Communist purposes in China" during "the past forty years."¹² He could apparently not have so risen by "flicking a raw spot on nearly everyone around him."¹³

Chou En-lai is now the Number Three man on the all-powerful Standing Committee. Described as "unpretentious," "suave," and a person with "tenacity" and "the keenest intelligence,"¹⁴ Chou has been the Party's outstanding diplomat and administrator for government machinery, and an internal peace-maker. His long tenure as Premier since 1949 and as concurrent Foreign Minister up to 1958, and his relative youth have now placed him ahead of the Party's "grand old man," Chu Teh, long-time hero in battles and currently ceremonial head of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the N.P.C. (National People's Congress) and spiritual leader of the Military. Succeeding Chou in the Foreign Ministry since 1958 has been Ch'en Yi, one of the 25-man Politburo; the capture of Shanghai by troops of the latter in 1949 in a disciplined manner gained favorable notices in Western quarters.¹⁵ Ch'en's quick wit¹⁶ also resembles Chou's, which might mean that he is a stand-by for Chou at the top administrative spot.

Ch'en Yün, an economist ranking fifth on the seven-man Standing Committee, is believed to have been "eclipsed" somewhat for the time being either because of policy differences with the prevailing majority or because of health.¹⁷ Lin Piao, Number Six, is now the young star of the era of technological and military effort serving since 1959 as Defense Minister charged with the responsibility to "bridge the gap between China's non-nuclear and nuclear status."¹⁸ P'eng Teh-huai, of the Politburo, whom Lin replaced and whose personal past made his fighting stamina dead-ly certain,¹⁹ apparently remains a stand-

¹¹ Liu Shao-ch'i, writing for the *World Marxist Review* (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*) on "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China," unshrinkingly cites the many "controversies between different viewpoints within our Party" on a host of important policy problems as he defends the prevailing Party line in each case. See *Ten Glorious Years*, pp. 11ff.

¹² For Mao's vigor, see William Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

¹³ "Red China's No. 2 Man," *Time*, May 11, 1959, p. 29.

¹⁴ See George Moorad, *Lost Peace in China*, New York, Dutton, 1949, p. 42; and Felix Greene, *Awakened China*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1961, pp. 39f. Author of the latter, an "Anglo-American" who went to China with a British passport in 1957 and 1960, had a lengthy interview with Chou.

¹⁵ See Robert Guillain, *600 Million Chinese*, New York, Criterion Press, 1957, p. 34.

¹⁶ As reported in Simone de Beauvoir, *The Long March*, New York, World Publishing Co., 1958, p. 162.

¹⁷ See a special report on Ch'en in *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 380, pp. 1-2. Cf. Harold C. Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁸ See Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1962, p. 176.

¹⁹ See an extensive account on P'eng in Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, New York, Random House, 1938, pp. 267ff.

by. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Number Seven and Secretary General of the whole Central Committee, is likewise a recent upstart following the footsteps of Liu Shao-ch'i, taking it as his business to "uphold the glorious tradition" of the Party.²⁰

In all major conduits of ruling power—political, administrative and military—the C.C.P. has thus provided and is prepared to perpetuate its steady, cohesive and effective leadership.

CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT

The C.C.P.'s complete control over the Government is perhaps the most amazing phenomenon in modern totalitarian politics. Aside from the well-known patterns of interlocking placement of Party and Government personnel at the joint apex, the extent of Party penetration of Government agencies is apparently no less considerable quite a way down the pyramidal structures. In the N.P.C., "the highest organ of state power," for instance, not only the chairman and 6 of the 14 vice chairmen of the all-important Standing Committee, but also 26 of the 60-odd members of the entire National Committee are Party members. The Secretary General (P'eng Chen), 2 of his 6 deputies, all chairmen and 6 of the 14 vice chairmen of the four legislative committees (Bills, Nationalities, Budget and Credentials) are likewise Party members.

The Party membership of the Chairman of the P.R.C. (Liu Shao-ch'i) and one of the two Vice Chairmen (Tung Pi-wu) is well

known; so is that of the Premier (Chou En-lai) and 16 Vice Premiers of the S.C. (State Council), "the highest administrative organ." But under them, about 325 out of some 440 headships and deputy headships of the 60 or so ministries, commissions, offices, secretariats, and organs under direct supervision of the S.C. also belong to the C.C.P. Out of these 60 agencies only 11 lesser ones have non-Communist heads who, however, are accompanied by authoritative Communist deputy heads. In the provinces, too, over 140 out of some 260-odd heads and deputy heads of their administrative councils are Party members, including all but 4 of the 26 provincial governors and both important mayors (P'eng Chen of Peking, and K'o Ch'ing-shih of Shanghai). The few non-Communist heads are likewise accompanied by a proportionately higher number of Communist deputy heads.²¹

In the judicial branch, the president and 4 of the 6 vice presidents of the S.P.C. (Supreme People's Court), and the president and all 4 vice presidents of the S.P.R. (Supreme People's Procuratorate) are C.C.P. members.

Even in the C.P.P.C.C. (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), now supposedly a form of "people's democratic united front" representing primarily other minor political parties, the C.C.P. glaringly, too, assumes positions of authority.

CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

The C.C.P.'s control over the Military—the P.L.A. (People's Liberation Army, i.e., all branches of the armed forces)—is likewise thorough and complete, contrary to some misconception or Soviet-centered projection of a "power struggle" between them. In the top advisory N.D.C. (National Defense Council) under the Chairman of the P.R.C. as ex officio presiding officer, for instance, 10 of its 13 Vice Chairmen and 67 of its 98 members are all Party heroes. The P.L.A., traditionally with Chu Teh as its Commander-in-Chief throughout the Chinese Communist movement, now comes under the direction of the Defense Ministry, the status of whose

²⁰ See his two important speeches on the 30th anniversary of the Party in *People's China*, July 1, 1951, pp. 32-35, and on revision of the Party's Constitution in *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956, Vol. I, pp. 171ff.

²¹ For example, Kansu, 5 out of 7; Chekiang, 4 out of 5. In some sensitive areas, sometimes a Party head would be assisted entirely by non-Communist deputy heads (e.g., Ninghsia Hui Autonomous region) or entirely by his comrades (e.g., Kueichow Province). For details of the personnel situation cited here and elsewhere in this study, consult American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Biographical Information Report Nos. 1 (November 29, 1960) and 1a (May 1, 1961): *Directory of Chinese Communist Leadership* (as amended).

head has been advanced from that of a member of the Party's Politburo (P'eng Teh-huai until 1959) to that of a member of its all-important Standing Committee (Lin Piao since then), side by side with Chu Teh. The Defense Minister also has all comrades serving as his ten Vice Ministers (eight regular and two alternate members of the Central Committee). At the Headquarters of the P.L.A., the Chief of General Staff (Lo Jui-ch'ing since 1959) is concurrently a Vice Defense Minister, with comrades serving as five of his six deputies. Under the Chiefs of General Staff are five general Departments (Political, Training, Personnel, Inspectorate and Logistics) of which all directing personnel except two deputies are Communists.

The Navy, Air Force, Armored Force, Artillery Force, Engineer Corps, Railway Corps and Signal Corps all have Communist commanders and political commissars. So do all the 13 major Military Regions in the country.²²

Current developments make political control over the Military even less equivocal. The first speech Lin Piao made after accession to the Defense Ministership in 1959 was no other than "March Ahead under the Red

Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking."²³ The trend since then has been continued reinforcement of "political work in the Army" with the explicit purpose to "use Mao Tse-tung's Thought to arm the minds of the youths" in the P.L.A., stressing "man [versus weapons] first, politics first, ideological work first, and live thinking first."²⁴ Latest reports indicate that units of the P.L.A. are still being employed in the service of "socialist" production and construction.²⁵

ROLE AMONG THE MASSES

At the most basic level, the C.C.P. also functions effectively among the population at large through an all-embracing, systematic and thorough process of mass organization. This was recognized in the very early days of the Peking regime as a major factor in its achievement of power and as the "institutional foundation" of its long-range development aiming at "complete reorganization of the Chinese body politic according to the Communist pattern."²⁶ People in all walks of life are organized into "federations," "associations," and so on. These are further divided into small groups for study, work, and even for recreational purposes, each with one or more "cadres" or "activists," Communist or near-Communist, as its moving nucleus. The whole history of mainland China since 1949, as a matter of fact, is viewed by some as consisting primarily of the processes of organization, along with industrialization. As a result, "each individual in China is a member of some organized association brought into existence by the Communists themselves."²⁷

In all organizations, beginning with the component groups, methods such as weekly "study" meetings and monthly "criticism and self-criticism" meetings centered on Maoism, Party policies, Communist interpretation of current affairs, progress or lack of it in individual work, are adopted to insure mass acceptance of C.C.P. ideology and program for all national activities.²⁸ The key essential in the Party-mass relationship—and in the Party's effective policy enforcement on a national scale, is therefore "organization: the

²² Cf. Alice Langley Hsieh, *op. cit.*, where omission of an analysis of this nature leads to an opposite view.

²³ Included in *Ten Glorious Years*, pp. 67ff.

²⁴ See *Union Research Service*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (October 10, 1961): "Ideological and Political Education among the Youth in Army," pp. 31-46. Cf. "Four Sets of Regulations on Political Work in Company-level Units of PLA Promulgated for Enforcement" and "The Political Work of the PLA Is Carried Out in a Flexible and Penetrating Manner," American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of Mainland China Press* (SCMP), Nos. 2630 (December 1, 1961), pp. 1ff, and 2654 (January 9, 1962), pp. 1ff respectively.

²⁵ E.g., "Chinese Army-men Held Peasants with Spring Farm Work," SCMP, No. 2708 (March 29, 1962), pp. 3ff.

²⁶ See A. Doak Barnett, "Mass Political Organization in Communist China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1951, pp. 76ff.

²⁷ See H. F. Schurmann, "Organization and Response in Communist China," *ibid.*, January, 1959, pp. 51ff; and D. E. T. Luard, "The Urban Commune," *The China Quarterly* (London), July/September, 1960, pp. 74ff.

²⁸ See Alec Nove, "Communists and Peasants," *Current Scene*, February 20, 1962, p. 5; and Felix Greene, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

ordered mobilization, control, and manipulation of people for certain ends.”²⁹

Externally, too, the C.C.P. does not exist in a vacuum devoid of fresh air, food or care. While the frequently reported friction between the C.C.P. and the C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in recent years—which is not a proper subject for review here—might seem to cast a shadow of doubt in this connection, the net result, after all is considered, has not been the isolation of the Chinese Communist Party.

In the first place, the C.C.P. has never ceased to acknowledge the C.P.S.U. as its own mentor, and exemplar and leader of the Communist world. On the other hand, the C.P.S.U., while depreciating chances of the C.C.P.’s coming to power reportedly as late as 1948,³⁰ has done enough to make up to the latter in the post-1949 period via the 1950 Friendship and Alliance Treaty and other mutual assistance and cooperation pacts, plus a recognition and propagation of the “revolutionizing effects” of the C.C.P. revolution upon “oppressed peoples of the East.” And even though reportedly declining Mao’s request for nuclear arms, the Soviet party has nevertheless provided technical aid in nuclear developments in China and Khrushchev, when pressed by international conditions created by the Chinese Party in 1958, did pronounce in no uncertain terms that an attack upon the People’s Republic of China (e.g., by the United States) would be regarded

as one “upon the Soviet Union itself.” Nonetheless, one must not discount once and for all the possibility that friction between the two Parties might engender a flare-up of a nationalistic character, considering the historical relations and geographical facts concerning the two countries.

Moving away from the “great duel” at the top, one sees that the C.C.P. has not been entirely without a following of its own in the Communist world at large. The Albania case has become only the most conspicuous example recently, especially from the European corner. And even this may be said to have been offset by Titoist reaction there. So far, East European Communist parties are known to have generally followed the C.P.S.U., with apparent good reasons. This has not been the situation in many Communist and affiliated groups in the non-Western areas.

The schism between the C.C.P. and the C.P.S.U., it must be recognized, constitutes also an opportunity for the former to try its own wings in the international Communist movement. If Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in early 1956 started the C.C.P.’s centrifugal development, as has been recognized, the C.C.P. certainly started also to do well for itself during that same year. The Eighth Congress of the C.C.P., the first since 1945, was convened in September. And to Peking were sent comradely Party delegations and representatives and messages from 62 different countries.³¹ Among these,

(Continued on page 182)

²⁹ See Leo A. Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*, National Science Foundation, 1961, pp. 4–6; and H. F. Schurmann, “Organizational Principles of the Chinese Communists,” *The China Quarterly*, April/June, 1960, pp. 47ff.

³⁰ See the “much quoted” statement attributed to Stalin in this regard in Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 264.

³¹ Forty-nine Parties sent delegations or representatives: 14 from West Europe; 9 from East Europe (including the Soviet Union); 12 from the Western Hemisphere; 7 from Asia; 6 from the Middle East and Africa; and 2 from Australia. Twelve sent messages only; 4 in West Europe; 4 in Asia; 2 in the Middle East and Africa; and 2 in the Western Hemisphere. For the statistics and related information cited here and below, see *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. III.

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"The participation of minor parties in the Communist government is a false pretense of shared authority, a masked exercise of Communist one-party totalitarian dictatorship."

Minor Parties in Communist China

By GEORGE P. JAN

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ONE of the characteristics of the Communist regime on the mainland of China thirteen years after its establishment is its continued tolerance of the existence of minor parties. This policy of the Communist party of China (hereafter C.P.C.) raises some interesting questions. Why does the C.P.C. continue to tolerate the existence of these minor parties? To what extent can these minor parties exert influence on the policies of Communist China? What are these parties and who are their leaders? What is their legal status in Communist China?

At the beginning of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there were 11 minor parties in the "coalition government."¹ One of them, the Chinese People's National Salvation Association, dissolved itself "honorably" on December 18, 1949, because it considered that its mission had been accomplished.² Two other minor parties, the Association of the Comrades of San Min Chu I and the Kuomintang Association for Promoting Democracy, were subsequently merged with the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and suspended their separate activities. There-

¹ *Parties Collaborating with the Communists* (Fu Ni Tang Pai) (Taipei, Taiwan: Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Interior, the Republic of China, 1950), p. 1.

² *Materials for the Study of the Great Charters of the People* (Jen Min Ta Hsien Chang Hsueh Hsi Tze Liao) (Tien Tsin, China: Lien Ho Tu Shu Chu Pan Sho, 1950), p. 171.

³ *People's Handbook* (Jen Min Shou Tso) (Peking: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1959), pp. 263-264.

fore, today there are only eight minor parties in Communist China.³

The elements of these minor parties are extremely complex. There are overlappings in their party membership. One individual often belongs to more than one minor party. In general, members of these minor parties can be classified into four major categories. The first category consists of leftist intellectuals. Their cooperation with the Communists is motivated by their patriotic sentiment and idealistic convictions. They were dissatisfied with the Kuomintang one-party rule and the unjust political, social and economic conditions in China. They believed that the Communist party could correct the evils of China. Most of them were not Communists although many of them had illusions about the Communist party. To this very day few of them are Communist party members. In this category, there are many outstanding Chinese scholars in various fields. Many leaders in the minor political parties belong to this category, especially members of the China Democratic League.

The second category consists of the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) members who are opposed to Chiang Kai-shek. Most of them are frustrated former Kuomintang officials and generals. Most of them, at one time or another, occupied high positions in the Kuomintang government. But they lost favor with Chiang Kai-shek or turned against him. This category includes

most of the members of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee.

The third category consists of persons who are relatively unknown in Chinese politics. They are neither established scholars nor one-time high-ranking Kuomintang officials, but are for the most part opportunists trying to get government jobs through the bargaining power of the minor parties. This category includes many of the rank and file members of all the minor parties.

The fourth category consists of Communists who disguised themselves as non-Communists and penetrated into minor parties before 1949, such as Chou Hsin-min of the China Democratic League.⁴ After 1949, the C.P.C. openly encouraged the Communists to join the Democratic League. In the last analysis, although all these minor parties are pro-Communist, not very many of their members are card-bearing Communists.⁵ Even the official analysis of the Nationalist government on Taiwan did not classify most of their members as Communists.⁶

The original political platforms of these minor parties were not Communistic in orien-

tation. For instance, the policy of the China Democratic League before 1949 resembled, in many ways, the concept of a multi-party parliamentary system.⁷ While all the minor parties have their constitutions and platforms, in reality, they are organized on the basis more of personal following than specific principles. They rely on cooperation between well-known leaders and their respective personal followings. Because they hated the Kuomintang one-party rule, these parties allied themselves with the C.P.C. to oppose the Kuomintang. In 1949, they joined hands with the C.P.C. under a coalition government and thus established the People's Republic of China, generally referred to as Communist China. By now, for all practical purposes, the minor parties no longer have independent principles and policies contrary to those of the C.P.C. The best evidence to prove this point is the "Joint Message of Greetings to Chairman Mao" signed by six minor parties in 1960. In this message, the minor parties pledged to Mao that they would lean to socialism, listen to him and follow the C.P.C.⁸

The membership of these minor parties is unknown to outsiders. The only organizations that know their exact membership are perhaps the parties themselves and the C.P.C. However, it is safe to say that their membership cannot be large. Another interesting aspect about the minor parties is their financial support. There is evidence to indicate that they receive subsidy from the Communist government.⁹ This gives the C.P.C. another means of controlling these parties.

The most active year of the minor parties under communism was 1949 when the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (hereafter C.P.P.C.C.) held its first session. Under the category of party delegates in the C.P.P.C.C., there were 14 "democratic parties." Two of these were official Communist organizations, the Communist Party of China and the China New Democracy Youth Corps. Eleven of these were pro-Communist parties but not official Communist organizations. The "independents" were pro-Communist leaders claiming to be non-partisan independents.¹⁰

⁴ Chu, Chu-yang, *How the Chinese Communist Party Treated the Democratic Parties* (Chung Kung Zen Yang Tui Tai Min Chu Tang Pai) (Kowloon: Yiu Lien Chu Pan Sho, 1952), p. 49.

⁵ *The Bright Road for Intellectuals* (Chi Shih Fen Tze Te Kuang Ming Tao Lu) (Canton, China: Kuang Ming Chu Pan Sho, 1952), p. 42. This is an official publication of the China Democratic League.

⁶ See *Parties Collaborating with the Communists*. The nature and composition of the minor parties in Communist China were analyzed at some length in this official publication of Nationalist China.

⁷ *Political Report of the Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the China Democratic League* (Min Chu Tung Meng Erh Chung Chuan Hui Cheng Chi Pao Kao) (Shanghai: Headquarters of the China Democratic League, 1947), p. 2.

⁸ *Current Background* (Hong Kong: American Consulate General, 1960), No. 639, p. 67.

⁹ *The Nature and Function of the China Democratic League* (Chung Kuo Min Chu Tung Men Te Hsing Chi Yu Jen Wu) (Canton, China: Kuang Ming Chu Pan Sho, 1950), p. 11. This is an official publication of the China Democratic League. Government subsidy is provided in Item 3 of Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the China Democratic League.

¹⁰ *Documents on the Establishment of the People's Republic of China* (Chung Hua Jen Min Kung Ho Kuo Kai Kuo Wen Hsien) (Hong Kong: Hsin Min Chu Chu Pan Sho, 1949), pp. 14-19.

In the C.P.P.C.C. the Communist party refused to have more delegates than the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and the Democratic League.¹¹ Superficially it appeared that the latter two parties had equal representation with the Communist party. However, a close examination of the membership revealed the hypocritical gesture of the Communists. In the C.P.P.C.C. of 1949, 165 delegates were labeled as party delegates, 116 as regional delegates, 71 as military delegates, 235 as delegates from civic organization and 75 as special delegates. There were 662 delegates altogether including alternates.¹² Although the Communist party had equal representation with the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and the China Democratic League under the category of party delegates, the regional delegates and the military delegates were all Communists, and so were most of the delegates from civic organizations. The special delegates were mostly former Kuomintang officials who surrendered to the Communists and pro-Communist "independent leaders." The reality was that about two-thirds of the delegates in the C.P.P.C.C. were Communists, placing the C.P.P.C.C. under the effective control of the Communist party.

In the government established in 1949 under the Common Program adopted by the C.P.P.C.C., Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Central People's Government Council. Of the six Vice Chairmen of the same Council three were non-Communists. Of the 55 members of the same Council about 22 were non-Communists. The Pre-

mier of the Government Administrative Council was Chou En-lai. He was assisted by four Vice Premiers of whom two were non-Communists. Of the sixteen members of the Government Administrative Council nine were non-Communists. Of the thirty ministers and commissioners in the central government nine were non-Communists. The minor parties also occupied a number of sub-ministry positions. Shen Chun-ju, a leader of the Democratic League, was even given the position of the President of the Supreme People's Court, roughly the counter-part of the Chief Justice of the United States.¹³

However, the minor parties felt the pressure of the C.P.C. not long after the first session of the C.P.P.C.C. In 1950, the C.P.C. ordered all the minor parties to revise their party programs.¹⁴ They had to pledge support of the policies of the C.P.C. against the interest of their own classes. The C.P.C. forbade the minor parties to try to build up a large following. In 1951, the C.P.C. specified the groups from which each minor party might recruit members.¹⁵

For instance, in December, 1950, the Central Committee of the China Democratic League adopted a resolution concerning the development of the League's organization. In this resolution, the League decided that it should recruit members from bourgeois intellectuals, cultural and educational workers. It decided that it would not develop its organization in the People's Liberation Army including security forces, military organizations, military schools and military enterprises, nor intelligence agencies, revolutionary universities,¹⁶ agencies dealing with diplomatic affairs, nor among minority nationalities. It also decided not to develop its organization in small cities and rural areas, and only to develop its organization in large cities which were political, economic and cultural centers.

These decisions were obviously made under the pressure of the C.P.C. for they seriously limited the area of activities of the Democratic League. This meant that the activities of the League were excluded not only from many government agencies, but also from rural

¹¹ *Materials for the Study of the Great Charters of the People*, p. 14.

¹² *Documents on the Establishment of the People's Republic of China*, p. 13.

¹³ This analysis is based on the writer's examination of the name lists of the high-ranking government officials in the Central Chinese Government. See *Documents of the People's Political Consultative Conference* (Jen Min Cheng Hsieh Wen Chien) (Peking: Hsin Hua Shu Tien, 1950), on various pages.

¹⁴ Chu, Chu-yang, pp. 49-50.

¹⁵ Harold C. Hinton, "Democratic Parties: End of An Experiment?" *Problems of Communism*, No. 3, Vol. 7, 1958, p. 42.

¹⁶ These are special universities for the training of career revolutionaries for the Communist regime.

areas, small cities and minority nationalities. This was a change from the League's policy before 1949 when it insisted on sharing political power in the central government as well as in local governments under a coalition government.¹⁷

The adoption of the constitution in 1954 further reduced the influence of the minor parties in the Communist government. Under the "Constitutional Government" of Communist China, the C.P.P.C.C. was reduced to a consultative institution according to Article 13 of the Common Program. It is no longer the legislature of the national government. The National People's Congress, the new national legislature, is not elected on a party basis. Of the 1226 deputies to the National People's Congress (hereafter N.P.C.) in 1954 the overwhelming majority were Communists. Of the 65 members of the Presidium of the N.P.C. in 1954, the majority were Communist deputies.¹⁸ The N.P.C. also adopted the committee system to handle legislative bills. A close examination shows that in all the committees in 1954, the majority were Communists.

In the constitutional government of 1954, the minor party leaders were given some ten ministerial positions plus a number of sub-ministry posts. Superficially, it seemed that the minor parties maintained roughly the same strength in the central government as they had done before 1954. Nevertheless, there were some major changes in the constitutional government in comparison with the government established under the Common Program in 1949. For instance, the number of deputy chiefs of state, the vice chairmen of the Central People's Government Council, was reduced from six to one. Therefore, all the five former non-Communist deputy chiefs of state were dropped.

Although the position of deputy chief of state is more a position of prestige than influence, the Communists felt the need in 1949 to share this prestige with the minor parties. This made the government look more like a coalition government.

In 1954, the Communists apparently felt that they no longer needed to share this prestige with the minor parties. Tung Pi-wu, an old-time Communist leader, replaced Shen Chun-ju as the President of the Supreme People's Court. All the Vice Premiers were Communists, as compared to two non-Communist Vice Premiers out of a total of four Vice Premiers before 1954. Of the 15 Vice Chairmen of the National Defense Committee only 4 were former Kuomintang Generals; all the rest were Communists. Through further collectivization of the rural areas after 1954, the activity of minor parties at the local level became increasingly difficult.

By 1958, when the people's communes were introduced, the activity of minor parties in the countryside was virtually impossible. By the end of 1958, Communist China organized all the peasants into communes. Later, the Communists established many communes in smaller cities and a limited number of communes in large cities. Nowhere in the commune organization was the role of minor parties mentioned; the C.P.C. is the only party organization in the communes.

After the rectification and anti-rightist campaigns of 1957, the rightists were subdued. In the Second National People's Congress beginning in 1959 the strength of minor parties was further reduced. Of the 62 members of the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. only about a dozen or so were non-Communists. In the central government in 1959, of the 30 ministries and 32 commissions and agencies under the direct supervision of the Premier only about 10 were headed by non-

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¹⁷ *Political Report of the Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the China Democratic League*, p. 26.

¹⁸ *Documents of the First Plenary Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Chung Hua Jen Min Kung Ho Kuo Ti Yi Chieh Chuan Kuo Jen Min Tai Piao Ta Hui Ti Yi Tse Hui Yi Wen Chien) (Peking: Jen Min Chu Pan Sho, 1954), p. 146.

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

President Kennedy's Statement on the Taiwan Strait

On June 27, 1962, President John F. Kennedy reaffirmed United States policy in support of the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and United States defense of the offshore islands. The text of the President's statement follows:

... The Situation in the area of the Taiwan Strait is a matter of serious concern to this Government.

Very large movements of Chinese Communist forces into this area have taken place. The purpose of these moves is not clear. It seems important in these circumstances that the position of the United States Government be clearly understood.

Our basic position has always been that we are opposed to the use of force in this area. In earlier years, President Eisenhower made repeated efforts to secure the agreement of Communist China to the mutual renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area. And our support for this policy continues.

One possibility is that there might be aggressive action against the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In that event the policy of this country will be that established seven years ago under the Formosa resolution. The United States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

In the last crisis in the Taiwan area in 1958, President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would not remain inactive in the face of any aggressive action against the offshore islands which might threaten Formosa. In my own discussion of this issue, in the campaign of 1960, I made it quite clear that I was in agreement with President Eisenhower's position on this matter. I stated this position very plainly, for example, on October 16, 1960, and I quote:

"The position of the Administration has been that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. I don't want the Chinese Communists to be under any misapprehension.

"I support the Administration policy towards Quemoy and Matsu over the last five years."

Under this policy, sustained continuously by the United States Government since 1954, it is clear that any threat to the offshore islands must be judged in relation to its wider meaning for the safety of Formosa and the peace of the area.

Exactly what action would be necessary in the event of any such act of force would depend on the situation as it developed. But there must be no doubt that our policy, specifically including our readiness to take necessary action in the face of force, remains just what it has been on this matter since 1955.

It is important to have it understood that on this point the United States speaks with one voice. But I repeat that the purposes of the United States in this area are peaceful and defensive.

As Secretary Dulles said in 1955, and I quote: "The treaty arrangements which we have with the Republic of China make it quite clear that it is in our mutual contemplation that force shall not be used. The whole character of that treaty is defensive."

This continues to be the character of our whole policy in this area now.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMMENTS ON CHINA

CHINA AND HER SHADOW. By TIBOR MENDE. (New York, Coward-McCann, Inc., First American Edition, 1962. 350 pages, notes and index, \$5.00.)

A French political scientist and well-known commentator, Tibor Mende describes the history and the program of Chinese communism, and its appeal for the Chinese and for the underprivileged peoples of the Far East. Noting that "the enthusiasm and the sincerity of most of these people [of China] has a background which we Westerners could hardly be expected to appreciate and even less to be able to share," Mende believes that historically speaking, "the ever-recurring motive of Chinese civilized life has been the integration of the individual in the Chinese totality." Mende writes of the progress toward modernization of Chinese life, the difficulties of industrialization, the "almost puritanic honesty" of Communist rule, the "hatred that colours the Chinese Communists' view of America." This is a knowledgeable account of a nation about whom Americans today know all too little.

CHINA'S POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE.

By HAROLD S. QUIGLEY. (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1962. Appendices, recommended readings, and index. 204 pages, \$4.50.)

This book, according to the preface, "is not addressed to specialists but to readers who feel a need for a concise introduction to Chinese politics and policies today." The author reviews Chinese history, government and philosophy in order to place contemporary developments "in perspective." Texts of the Chinese constitutions and treaties with the United States and

the U.S.S.R. add to the usefulness of this brief volume.

UNITY AND CONTRADICTION. Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations. Edited by KURT LONDON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 421 pages and notes, \$7.50.)

Scholars from 11 nations met at Tokyo at the Third International Conference on Sino-Soviet Bloc Affairs to evaluate the Communist countries. Twenty studies were subsequently edited for this symposium, under nine topic headings, including sociology, ideology and conflicts of ideology, Russian and Chinese policies toward foreign nations, territorial issues, agricultural problems and economic relations between the two great Communist powers. Authors include, among others, C. E. Black, Robert Byrnes, Paul F. Langer, Philip E. Mosely, and Peter Tang, all well-known to CURRENT HISTORY readers.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY. By R. G. BOYD. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. 141 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

Research at the Institute of Advanced Studies at the Australian National University in 1959-1961 led Australian R. G. Boyd to write this analysis of China's foreign policy, the ideology behind it, Chinese alignment with the U.S.S.R., and its challenges to Asia and the West.

BRITAIN AND CHINA. By EVAN LUARD. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 254 pages and index, \$5.00.)

This first in a series of studies of Britain's foreign policy sponsored by St. Antony's

College, Oxford, is a well-written and coherent study of Sino-British-relations, past and present, with a third section devoted to Chinese aspirations and the future of Chinese and British policies. Noting that "The Far East is now an independent sphere of action in which Britain can play little part," this specialist believes that Britain must "find collective means to ensure that the peace of these distant regions shall remain secure."

Discussing the reasons why China should become a member of the "family of nations," Luard contends that the Communists are in effective control of more than 700 million people and that "it may be doubted whether any body which excludes the representatives of a quarter of the world's population can properly describe itself as a world organization."

POWER RELATIONS WITHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVE-

CHINA AND COMMUNIST BLOC

Continued from p. 135

ciently explored in recent years—and this has been a valuable contribution by the scholars involved—to leave no reasonable doubt as to their reality. But the arguments for unity, in particular the powerful ideological arguments, are too often overlooked. Moreover, to view China's foreign policy in recent years solely in the context of the Sino-Soviet relationship is to remark only its truculence and to ignore some evidence of moderation. This was manifested, for instance, in Peking's posture in Cambodia, in the resolution of the border crisis with Burma and in the statesmanlike resolution of the problem of overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Peking is not in all matters so intransigent as some students of the Sino-Soviet "dialogue" hold it to be.

China's intransigence, in any event, is far less significant in this writer's view than China's active entry into Communist bloc affairs since 1956. Peking at the moment, within the context of Marxian formulations, happens to represent the extreme Left, where

MENT, 1930–1934. A Study of Documents. BY TSO-LIANG HSIAO. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. 305 pages, chronology, glossary, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Professor of International Relations at National Taiwan University in Taipei, Dr. Hsiao has drawn on newly-available documentary material for this scholarly study, the first section in a study of Chinese communism in the 1930's. The publication of this volume was furthered by the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington.

T.H.B.

ERRATUM: The editors regret an error on page 306 of our May, 1962, issue. The book of readings, "The Balance of Power and Nuclear Deterrence," published by Houghton Mifflin, was edited by Frederick H. Gareau of the University of Mississippi.

Yugoslavia, "polycentrists" and Revisionists represent the Right and Moscow, the moderating center. Or so at least it seems to those watching from the outside. But more important than these postures *per se* is the fact that Peking represents an *alternate* leadership in the Communist world. When there is disagreement among the Parties—and unanimity is an illusion at best—dissidents may, and do, turn to Peking. This is the true meaning of the Albanian episode, not merely that China and Russia disagree. Whether Moscow and Peking compose their differences, or even reverse positions over a period of time, the Communist community is not likely again to see a single, supposedly infallible leadership.

Our initial question, then, would appear to be answerable only with a qualification: ideology is doubtless strong enough to keep China in the bloc, against other considerations, *if* Peking is permitted to offer alternate leadership. If not, if China is forced to propagate heresies "in the marsh," it could not remain allied with the bloc as presently constructed, and the bloc itself would presumably collapse.

CHINA IN SOUTH ASIA

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or anti-Communist South Vietnam (since Cambodia has no common boundary with North Vietnam either). Both alternatives are likely to precipitate a major crisis in Southeast Asia. It is here that an intelligent Western move, along the lines of the 1950 United States-British-French declaration guaranteeing the borders of Israel and her Arab neighbors, could have contributed to the peace of the area. To be sure, the "Umbrella Clause" of the 1954 Seato Pact covers Cambodia against Communist aggression (which, geographically speaking, is remote) but not against the appetites of her non-Communist neighbors. In that sense, the C.P.R. "counter-guarantee" closes the gap left by the Seato Treaty, as far as Cambodia is concerned.

Red China's military position in Southeast Asia and along the Indian border is ominous—but it is perhaps not really so threatening as it is made out to be. Without even bringing into the argument the extremely important economic setbacks which China recently suffered, its military posture along its southern frontier cannot be compared with its combat capability in the Korean war. There, Red China operated at the short end of the excellent Manchurian railroad system, close to its best centers of industrial production. Russian equipment was only a few miles away in nearby Rashin and Vladivostok and, above all, its rear areas were safe by Western volition.

In the case of a military involvement in South or Southeast Asia, all these factors would turn *against* Red China: the road and rail system in Sinkiang, Tibet and Yünnan ranges from poor to wretched; Chinese troops would operate at the end of an immense supply line that would have to stretch clear across the Chinese subcontinent, and there is absolutely no assurance that the game of the "sanctuary" can be played once more.

This leaves as a major Chinese ploy the limited gnawing-away at ill-defined borders.

Right at this moment, India—by her own short-sightedness; her go-it-alone neutrality (one *can* be neutral without having to be aloof toward one's own neutral neighbors); and her unwillingness to admit past errors by refusing thus far to drag the C.P.R. in front of the United Nations as an "aggressor" for her border encroachments—will no doubt have to pay the price of her mistakes with large tracts of her present borderlands. The total helplessness of Laos may well make the tiny kingdom a likely candidate for border "adjustments." And how Thailand and South Vietnam will survive the current test of strength is anybody's guess.

CHINESE POPULATION PROBLEM

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chological appeal of the southern delta lands of the Mekong, Menam and Irrawaddi Rivers to a population having grown too dense for much surplus in China. The evidence which he marshals strongly supports the possibilities of a Chinese spill-over into Indochina. Indeed, the historic march southward into the rice lands by the Han-Chinese people may have gained additional strength through new cultural clothing, namely dynamic communism. Posing as an Asian champion of anti-imperialism, Wiens concludes, Peking has disguised its own expansionist role. Yet a full-scale advance into Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma and beyond runs the dangers of an open clash with the military power of the free world led by the United States.

On the other hand, the successful establishment of Communist regimes throughout southeast Asia may not necessarily result in the opening of the gates to Chinese settlement. Indeed, concern for their own lands and people may compel potential new Communist states on China's periphery to look to Moscow for leadership and protection, as may be suggested by the performance of the North Korean and North Vietnam, as well as the Laotian, Communists. Outright an-

nexation of the fertile southeast Asian lands, with all the enormous risks that that would involve, may be the only way in which the Chinese could swarm into the tropics, or at least gain effective control of their surplus rice potential.

At the most, the West can do little more than speculate on what the future holds for the world as China struggles to survive and grow under the shadow of the "bomb" and the east-west conflict.

FARM CRISIS IN RED CHINA

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Perhaps one of the most serious long-term implications of recent economic development in Communist China is that the feasible growth rate must now be reduced as a result of (1) shift of emphasis from investment in industry, a fast growing sector, to investment in agriculture, a slow-growing sector, (2) need to increase consumption per capita in order to prevent a recurrence of the "incentive crisis," and (3) continual population growth. These conditions could perhaps be altered should new technological breakthroughs succeed in drastically altering the productivity of agricultural investment or if large-scale foreign aid were forthcoming. However, the first condition is as uncertain as the second is unreliable. At stake therefore is the experiment to uplift the Chinese economy by its own bootstraps, not to mention the very existence of a regime which has brought itself to the brink of disaster.

PARTY RULE

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27 delegations in their congratulatory expressions, stuck to the traditional "C.P.S.U.-first" line while acknowledging encouragement from the C.C.P.'s achievements.

³² See a very good summary of the developments in the "Introduction" section of *The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents*, ed. by Dan N. Jacobs, Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson & Co., 1962.

Twenty-three, including the Soviet Union itself, applauded the C.C.P. and the C.P.S.U. "side by side" as the leading forces or co-inspirers of the movement. And 12 delegations mentioned the C.C.P., only, either out of pure courtesy or in genuine tribute to the Chinese Party as the most immediate, meaningful example of communism. In other words, 35 out of 62 international Communist parties on this occasion specifically recognized the new and special status of the C.C.P., with most of those from Asia, Africa and Latin America especially quick to point out the applicability of its course of success in "colonial and semi-colonial" countries such as theirs.

Although the C.C.P.'s reservation toward Khrushchev's handling of Stalinism was subdued in 1956 even after the Congress, the Polish and Hungarian incidents occasioned the Kremlin's engaging of Peking's good-office envoys to East Europe. To the C.C.P., and in the eyes of other international Communist parties, this indicated Peking's position and usefulness. Thus, as reported controversies between the two top Parties came to the fore concerning application of the "peaceful co-existence" thesis to "bourgeois" countries and parties (especially to the United States), the commune system, methods of "national liberation" for the developing areas, there was no question of simple obedience to the lead of the Soviet Party. Many international Communist parties tried to maintain neutrality and stress unity as a solution, but some found it necessary, or now safe, to take sides with the C.C.P.—as, for example, the Albanian, Indonesian, Indian and many Latin American Parties reportedly did.³²

Such an international environment affords the C.C.P. both dangers and promises, of course; but as long as it is not in the interest of the Soviet party to let its Chinese ally face destruction from any source, including possibly itself, the Chinese party apparently has more to gain than to lose under present circumstances. For whether communism can now be said to have its own "East and West," the mere trend toward "polycentrism," that is, the rise of a new center of power, attraction and leadership in the bloc,

bespeaks the unmistakable enhancement of the international stature and security of the C.C.P.

All in all, therefore, one sees that the Maoist leadership in China actually sits on the top, or the joint apex, of all three pyramidal power structures—the political, the administrative, and the military. The C.C.P. membership, now nearly 2.5 per cent of the entire population, in turn functions with nuclear efficiency in the country at large. The Party, hence, is the life of the Communist rule in China; fluctuation in its strength and integrity—but hardly other superficial, peripheral factors—will serve as a barometer of the fortune of this rule. And since the Party has gone through a long series of fluctuations in 40 years of history, a balanced view with historical perspective might be preferable to the exaggerated exaltation or depreciation of “a single zig or zag.”³³

³³ William Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

MINOR PARTIES

Continued from p. 177

Communists. In the central government today headed by Liu Shao-chi, all important positions above ministry level are headed by Communists with only a few exceptions.

It is true some of the minor party leaders were given positions in the Communist government. But do they have real power and influence? The position of the minor party leaders who participate in the government can be evaluated from a report submitted to the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. in 1956 by Li Wei-han, Director of the United Front Work Department of the C.P.C. Central Committee. In his report, Li pointed

¹⁹ *Documents of the Third Plenary Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Chung Hua Jen Min Kung Ho Kuo Ti Yi Chieh Chuan Kuo Jen Min Tai Piao Ta Hui Ti San Tse Hui Yi Wen Chien) (Peking: Jen Min Chu Pan Sho, 1956), p. 296.

²⁰ *The People's Daily* (Jenmin Jihpao), September, 1956, p. 1.

²¹ *Current Background*, No. 639, 1960, p. 3.

out that some Communist officials did not respect the authority of the non-Communist officials in the government, nor did they cooperate with non-Communist officials.¹⁹

It is safe to say that members of the minor parties who work in the Communist government do not have real political power concerning decision-making or even day-to-day routine administration. Although some of them are appointed as heads of ministries or commissions, actual power is in the hands of the vice ministers or deputy commissioners. The minor party leaders who head ministries or commissions or lower level government agencies are only figureheads.

The minor parties do not perform the function of opposition nor can they supervise the C.P.C. by criticism. A few minor party leaders who were naive enough to criticize the C.P.C. during the “Hundred Flowers Bloom” period in 1957 were ruthlessly purged. The participation of the minor parties in the Communist government is obviously not in the tradition of the multi-party parliamentary system that is practiced in the West.

The participation of minor parties in the Communist government is a false pretense of shared authority, a masked exercise of Communist one-party totalitarian dictatorship.

What will be the future of the minor parties in Communist China? The Communists have assured them that the united front will be continued beyond the attainment of socialism; as long as the C.P.C. exists, the minor parties will continue to exist.²⁰ But how sincere is this Communist assurance? The fate of the minor parties depends upon the policy of the C.P.C. The period of massacre is over in Communist China unless serious situations call for it. There is no indication that the Communists want to liquidate these parties by force. On the contrary, the C.P.C. has adopted a long range policy designed to reform these parties step by step. This is the so-called “soft-breeze-and-light-drizzle” policy.²¹ This means that the minor parties will be transformed into socialist parties slowly and gently like a soft breeze and light drizzle. The process of transformation will be long, but it will be steady.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of July, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

July 10—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev proposes that U.S., British and French troops in West Berlin be replaced with forces from the smaller European nations.

July 12—United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk repeats that troops of the major Western powers will remain in Berlin as part of any East-West agreement on the city's future.

July 16—The Soviet Union rejects a Western proposal of June 25 for a 4-power meeting to explore means to halt future violence along the Berlin wall.

July 17—U.S. President John F. Kennedy tells the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin that withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin is a non-negotiable issue.

July 21—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary Rusk resume "exploratory" talks in Geneva on a possible Berlin settlement.

July 23—Kennedy reports that Rusk and Gromyko, after 2 days of talks, have moved no closer to a Berlin accord.

Disarmament

(See also *U.S.S.R.* and *U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

July 9—The Soviet-sponsored World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace opens in Moscow with 2,000 delegates from 100 countries.

July 14—At the conclusion of the World Peace Congress a communiqué is issued condemning in general terms nuclear testing and the arms race.

July 16—After a month's recess, the Geneva

disarmament conference resumes. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy* and *Military.*)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

July 16—A 3-part tariff conference that opened in September, 1960, ends at Geneva. The 40-nation conference announces that concessions involving \$4.9 billion in world trade have been negotiated, with 4,400 concessions exchanged.

International Economic Conference of Nonaligned Nations

July 9—Delegates from 37 countries meet in Cairo to discuss their economic problems. The conference is sponsored by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic and President Tito of Yugoslavia.

July 18—Concluding a 10-day conference, delegates of the developing nations call on the industrial powers to join a worldwide program of more aid and freer trade.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

July 25—The Permanent Council of Nato unanimously approves the appointment of U.S. General Lyman Lemnitzer as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe to succeed General Lauris Norstad on November 1.

United Nations

(See also *Congo, Republic of the*)

July 20—The International Court of Justice gives an advisory opinion that all U.N. members are legally obligated to pay for special assessments.

July 23—Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan of British Guiana asks the U.N. to demand

that Britain grant immediate independence to his country.

July 25—Britain tells the Committee on Colonialism that Guiana's independence must await a full inquiry into last February's rioting.

July 26—The Security Council recommends U.N. membership for Rwanda and Burundi.

West Europe

July 3—Britain applies for membership in Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community) but specifies that her nuclear defense program must remain outside the arrangement.

July 12—The European Broadcasting Union charges that France violated an international agreement by transmitting the first television broadcast from Europe to the U.S. via the Telstar satellite.

July 23—The first formal exchange of live television across the Atlantic takes place as Telstar transmits two 20-minute programs from the U.S. to Europe and from Europe to the U.S.

July 30—At 12:01 A.M., a variable levy on farm imports goes into effect on trade among the 6 European Common Market members and with outside countries. This single levy replaces import quotas, minimum price regulations and tariffs for grains, poultry, eggs and pork. The single variable levy can be revised daily if necessary to raise the prices of farm imports to the level of the domestic prices of the importing nation.

July 31—British Foreign Secretary Home states that negotiations for British entry into the Common Market are not "deadlocked." Talks are scheduled to resume tomorrow; they stopped on July 28 when the question of maintaining farm imports from Commonwealth countries produced disagreement.

World Youth Festival

July 30—Some 5,000 rioters assemble to protest the meeting of the Communist-sponsored Youth Festival, which opened yesterday,

in Finland. Police and Finnish demonstrators battle for 3 hours. The anti-World Youth Festival rioters are dispersed by tear gas bombs.

ALBANIA

July 16—Parliament unanimously re-elects Mehmet Shehu as Premier.

ALGERIA

(See *France Overseas*.)

ARGENTINA

July 24—The government issues 4 decrees banning the Peronist and Communist parties, providing controls over internal affairs of all parties and installing a system of proportional representation.

AUSTRIA

July 16—Hundreds of farmers throughout the country stage protest demonstrations against rising prices and regulated farm income.

July 25—Parliament is dissolved following a decision of the government to hold national elections on November 18.

BRAZIL

July 10—The Chamber of Deputies confirms Francisco Brochado da Roche as Premier.

July 13—The Chamber of Deputies approves the cabinet selected by Premier Brochado da Roche.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

July 1—Most of the 750 physicians in Saskatchewan Province go on strike to protest the provincial government's medical care plan which takes effect today.

July 23—Saskatchewan's physicians reach agreement with the provincial government on ending their strike. The government agrees to call the legislature into special session and to amend the act to meet medical objections; the College of Physicians and Surgeons agrees to call its members back to normal service.

Great Britain

- July 1—Convicted spy Robert Soblen attempts to commit suicide aboard an airliner carrying him from Israel to the U.S. and is taken to a London hospital.
- July 6—Soblen applies for political asylum in England.
- July 13—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan drops 7 cabinet members, including Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd, who is replaced by Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling. Minister of Defense Harold Watkinson is replaced by Peter Thorneycroft. R. A. Butler becomes First Secretary of State and is named Deputy Prime Minister.
- July 16—Macmillan completes his reorganization by calling for the resignation of 9 junior ministers and by adding 11 young Conservatives to his government.
- July 22—In the second such incident this month, 55 persons are arrested after a fascist demonstration in London ends in violence.
- July 26—By a vote of 351 to 253, the Conservatives defeat a motion of censure in Commons against Macmillan.

The Court of Appeals rejects Soblen's appeal for release from detention by British immigration authorities.

India

- July 10—India charges that Chinese troops have encircled an Indian army outpost in the disputed Ladakh area of Kashmir.
- July 21—Peking charges that Indian troops have launched an attack on a Chinese frontier post in Ladakh.
- July 24—India is reported to have reclaimed 3,500 square miles in Ladakh of the 12,000 square miles overrun by the Chinese since 1959.
- July 30—Ten nations, including the U.S., and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development pledge a total of \$1,070,000,000 to India to assist her in the second year of her present 5-year plan.

Malaya

(See also *Philippines, The*)

- July 16—Prime Minister Tunk Abdul Rahman arrives in London for talks on the creation of a Federation of Malaysia.
- July 31—Malayan Prime Minister Abdul Rahman and British Prime Minister Macmillan sign documents establishing a Federation of Malaysia. The Federation will consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo.

New Zealand

- July 12—Two Soviet diplomats are expelled for espionage.

Nigeria

- July 22—Chief Obafemi Awolowo, founder of the Action Group and leader of the parliamentary opposition, receives an ovation from 200,000 followers upon his return to Lagos after 7 weeks of curtailed activity ordered by the federal government.
- July 23—The federal government begins an investigation of corruption in 6 public corporations run by the Action Group party in the Western Region.

Pakistan

- July 16—President Mohammad Ayub Khan signs legislation permitting the reestablishment of political parties. The Muslim League and the Muslim Brotherhood announce their immediate revival.

Tanganyika

- July 31—Julius Nyerere, ex-Premier and leader of the ruling Tanganyika African National Union, announces that he will run for the presidency in November.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Aden

- July 23—In London a conference opens on the future of Aden.
- July 25—Delegates to the London conference reach agreement in principle on the merger of Aden with the 11-state South Arabian Federation. Aden wishes to have self-government before the merger becomes effective.

British Guiana

(See *International, United Nations*)

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

July 16—A 3-man British government mission arrives in Salisbury to investigate the possibility of continuing the Federation.

Kenya

July 10—Britain announces she will provide funds to buy one million acres of farmland owned by whites for the resettlement of landless natives.

BULGARIA

July 29—The Bulgarian government announces price increases for farm products and economic incentives for peasants to increase farm output.

BURMA

July 4—The military government announces the organization of an initial single political group to form a national party eventually to take over leadership from the Revolutionary Council.

July 7—Troops fire on rioting students at the Rangoon University campus, killing 17 and wounding 40.

July 8—Military authorities blow up the Student Union building, which they call the center of Communist activity, and close the university.

July 11—The Revolutionary Council sets up special courts empowered to impose death sentences for insurrection or acts against the state.

BURUNDI

July 1—The Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi becomes two independent countries, the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

(See also *British Commonwealth of Nations, India*)

July 20—Reports reaching Hong Kong indicate that China's summer grain crop will fall below that of last year.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

July 11—Premier Cyrille Adoula reduces by half his cabinet of 43 ministers by removing members of the extreme Right and Left.

July 17—An estimated 10,000 women storm a U.N. roadblock at Elisabethville.

July 20—Speaking in Helsinki, U Thant, Acting U.N. Secretary General, calls the leaders of Katanga "a bunch of clowns."

July 24—U Thant submits to his U.N. Congo advisory committee a program of economic pressure to compel Katanga to accept the authority of the central government.

July 29—Adoula proposes a new Congolese constitution that will allow for provincial autonomy in certain areas to meet the demands of secessionist Katanga Province President Moise Tshombe. Adoula asks the U.N. to send a group of constitutional advisers to draft the new constitution.

July 30—Tshombe expresses approval of the proposed constitution, under which each province will retain control of local administrations, be able to make its own economic arrangements, and maintain law and order within its territory.

EL SALVADOR

July 1—Lieutenant Colonel Julio Rivera is inaugurated for a 5-year term as President.

ETHIOPIA

July 1—Concluding a 10-day visit to Eritrea, Emperor Haile Selassie charges that "traitors," "alien puppets" and "hypocrites" are trying to create disunity between that northern region and Ethiopia proper.

July 13—Eight persons are killed when a hand grenade is thrown into a meeting addressed by Haile Selassie's personal representative in Eritrea.

FINLAND

(See *International, World Youth Festival*)

FRANCE

July 2—West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer arrives in Paris for an official visit.

July 5—The National Assembly removes the parliamentary immunity of former Premier Georges Bidault so he may be prosecuted on charges of plotting against the state.

President Charles de Gaulle and Adenauer agree that European unity should be actively pursued without awaiting Britain's possible membership in the Common Market.

July 12—France repays in advance \$293.4 million owed to the U.S. and also buys \$112.5 million worth of gold from the U.S.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

(See also *Morocco*.)

July 1—More than 70 per cent of Algeria's eligible voters cast ballots in a referendum on ending 132 years of French rule. Unofficial returns indicate a majority vote for Algeria's independence in cooperation with France.

Mohammed Ben Bella, Deputy Premier of the Provisional Government, denounces the nationalist government's dissolution of the general staff of the Liberation Army.

July 2—Algerian Nationalist Army officers on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier denounce the Provisional Government and say they will follow orders from ousted Chief of Staff Colonel Houari Boumedienne.

July 3—France issues a proclamation of Algerian independence and extends diplomatic recognition. The Provisional Government, headed by Premier Benyoussef Ben Khedda, arrives in Algiers from Tunis.

The official vote in the referendum is announced: 5,975,581 voted for independence and 16,534 voted against it.

July 4—Algerian army officers loyal to Vice Premier Ben Bella seize the Provisional Government's Embassy at Rabat, Morocco.

July 5—The Liberation Army challenges the legality of the Provisional Government and threatens force unless a Parliament is called to set up a new regime.

Violence in Oran between Europeans and Muslims results in 100 deaths.

July 7—Morocco orders the Liberation Army to evacuate the Algerian embassy in Rabat; the building is taken over by troops loyal to Premier Ben Khedda.

July 12—Arriving in Oran, Ben Bella says there can be no compromise with Ben Khedda's Provisional Government, which he terms "counter-revolutionary."

July 22—Charging that Ben Khedda is a "usurper," Ben Bella's group declares it is supplanting the Provisional Government.

July 25—Ben Bella's troops seize control of the Constantine and Bone regions in eastern Algeria.

July 27—The seaport of Philippeville falls to Ben Bella forces.

July 29—Troops from Willaya 4, adjoining Algiers and one of the 6 military zones of Algeria, take control of the city of Algiers. The commanders of Willaya 4 announce that the city is open to "all the leaders" interested in negotiating an end to "the present crisis."

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

July 4—In a trial to discourage escapees, East Germany's Supreme Court hands out stiff prison terms to 5 men charged with attempting to cross the Berlin wall.

July 14—An American student is sentenced to 21 months imprisonment on charges of having tried to help an East German escape to the West.

July 19—Authorities establish a forbidden zone 3 miles wide along East Germany's entire Baltic seacoast.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 11—Wolfgang Fraenkel, Chief Prosecutor of the Federal Supreme Court, goes into "compulsory retirement" after the Bonn government verifies charges by East Germany that he had been active in Nazi courts.

July 28—Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss declares that West Germany can-

not enlarge its armed forces beyond 500,000 men, even if Nato demands an increase.

INDONESIA

July 19—Foreign Minister Subandrio arrives in Washington to resume negotiations with the Netherlands over the future of Netherlands New Guinea.

July 28—Amid reports that negotiations over West New Guinea have become stalemated, President Sukarno orders Subandrio to return home.

July 31—It is reported that Indonesian and Dutch officials meeting in Washington have announced agreement on the transfer of control of West New Guinea to the United Nations and later to Indonesia. Both governments must approve the agreement.

IRAN

July 17—Premier Ali Amini resigns and says that "tardy economic aid" from the U.S. and the ending of military assistance have made it impossible for him to carry out his projects.

July 19—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi appoints Assodollah Alam as Premier. Alam says he will continue the policies of his predecessor.

ISRAEL

July 1—Convicted spy Robert Soblen is expelled. (See also *British Commonwealth, Great Britain.*)

ITALY

July 8—Major rioting and violence erupt in Turin as striking metal workers battle police.

July 12—The government tells Parliament that "Communist elements" were responsible for the 3 days of riots in Turin.

JAPAN

July 1—The governing Liberal-Democratic party retains its majority in elections for members for the upper house of the Diet.

July 18—Premier Hayato Ikeda replaces 13 of his 16 cabinet members. Foreign Min-

ister Zentaro Kosaka is replaced by Masayoshi Ohira, former Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.

KOREA

July 10—Kim Hyun Chui, chairman of the Economic Planning Board, is named Premier by the ruling military junta.

LAOS

July 2—The 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos resumes after a 5-month recess.

July 23—An international pact guaranteeing the neutrality and independence of Laos is signed in Geneva by the foreign ministers of 14 nations.

July 24—U.S. Ambassador Unger calls on Acting Premier Prince Souphanouvong to renew talks on the release of U.S. and Filipino prisoners captured during the 2 years of civil war.

MOROCCO

July 7—French and Moroccan negotiators in Paris sign a series of accords under which France is to start a new program of financial and technical aid to Morocco.

July 14—The government protests strongly to the Algerian Provisional Government against the reported occupation of 3 Moroccan outposts in the Sahara.

NETHERLANDS, THE

(See *Indonesia.*)

PERU

July 16—The cabinet of President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche resigns because of the armed forces' demand for annulment of last month's presidential election.

July 18—The armed forces overthrow and imprison President Prado; Congress is barred from convening and constitutional guarantees are suspended.

The U.S. suspends diplomatic relations with Peru.

July 19—The U.S. halts all economic aid under the Alliance for Progress program and civilian technicians are ordered off their jobs.

July 20—The U.S. suspends its military assistance to Peru, amounting to \$5 million a year.

July 23—Most workers ignore a general strike called by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Apra) against the military junta.

July 29—Prado is freed. His 6-year legal term as president expired yesterday.

PHILIPPINES, THE

July 27—President Diosdado Macapagal proposes the creation of a Confederation of Greater Malaya, including the Philippines, to supersede the British-sponsored Federation of Malaysia.

RWANDA

July 1—The former Belgian territory of Ruanda-Urundi becomes two independent, free nations, Rwanda and Burundi.

THAILAND

July 27—The U.S. Defense Department announces that remaining U.S. marines in Thailand are being withdrawn, leaving 2,200 army and 1,000 air force men in the country.

TUNISIA

July 20—France and Tunisia announce the resumption of diplomatic relations, exactly a year after relations were broken off because of fighting around the Bizerte naval base.

U.S.S.R., THE

July 13—The Soviet Union says it has the right to carry out the last nuclear test because the U.S. carried out the first one in 1945. (See also *Int'l., Disarmament.*)

Khrushchev tells a group of U.S. newspaper editors that the Soviet Union has an anti-missile missile that can hit "a fly in outer space."

July 18—The appointment of Veniamin E. Dymshits to the post of chairman of the State Planning Committee is announced. He is also named a Deputy Premier and becomes the first Jew to hold such high office since 1957.

July 21—The government orders tests of the latest types of nuclear weapons to be held following the current series of U.S. tests.

July 28—The seventh unmanned Sputnik in the latest space study series is launched.

July 29—Soviet Navy Day is celebrated. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov declares that atomic submarines equipped with torpedos with nuclear warheads and rockets form "the basis of our naval fleet."

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See also *Int'l., Int'l. Econ. Conference.*)

July 21—Armed forces of the U.A.R. fire 4 rockets from the desert west of Cairo. President Nasser claims the weapons were made in Egypt and have a range of 400 miles.

July 25—Nasser formally opens a jet aircraft factory equipped to turn out trainers, fighters and troop transports.

UNITED STATES, THE

Economy

July 9—The Federal Reserve Board cuts the minimum cash requirement for stock market purchases from 70 to 50 per cent.

July 19—The Treasury reports that the fiscal 1962 deficit was \$6.3 billion.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Int'l., Berlin and Peru.*)

July 4—In an Independence Day speech, Kennedy says the U.S. looks forward to a "Declaration of Interdependence" to bring the U.S. closer to a united Europe.

July 6—Travel restrictions for Soviet visitors in the U.S. are lifted.

July 12—Kennedy postpones his trip to Brazil scheduled for July 30 until November.

July 26—Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos arrives in Washington.

July 30—Called home for consultation, Arthur H. Dean, head of the U.S. delegation to the 17-nation disarmament conference in Geneva, meets with President Kennedy and leading government officials to discuss the possibility of modifying U.S. conditions for a nuclear weapons test ban agreement.

Government

- July 2—The Senate approves and sends to the White House a compromise sugar bill.
- July 3—A federal court names a special master to draw a reapportionment plan for Wisconsin.
- July 5—Foy D. Kohler is named Ambassador to Moscow.
- July 10—Telstar, a 170-pound communications satellite, is put into orbit in a joint effort by the government and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. In Telstar's first experimental operation, a televised program is relayed from Maine to Brittany, France. (See also *International, West Europe.*)
- July 11—The Treasury Department issues new rules for more liberal allowances for depreciation of machinery and equipment to aid business.
- July 12—Abraham Ribicoff resigns as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
- July 13—A federal district judge declares Billie Sol Estes bankrupt.
- A federal court rules the Georgia legislature must reapportion itself or have the court do it.
- July 14—Cleveland, Ohio's Mayor, Anthony Celebrezze, is named Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
- July 16—Congress completes action on amendments to the recently passed sugar bill to raise the quota for the Dominican Republic.
- July 17—The Senate, 52 to 48, rejects the Administration's program for medical care for the aged.
- July 18—Kennedy appoints a 12-member Consumers Advisory Council.
- The 3-month deadlock between the Senate and House Appropriations Committees is temporarily broken.
- July 19—A farm bill stripped of strict production controls for major crops is passed by the House.
- July 21—A federal court orders immediate reapportionment of the Alabama Legislature.

- July 23—A federal court orders reapportionment of the Florida Legislature.
- July 24—The House passes and sends to the White House the \$4.6 billion foreign aid authorization measure.
- July 25—The House approves a bill to assure equal pay for equal work, regardless of the sex of the worker.
- Kennedy informs Governor Luis Muñoz Marin of Puerto Rico that he agrees the time has come for the islanders to vote on their preference for statehood, independence or permanent commonwealth relationship.
- July 27—A Senate filibuster begins against the satellite communications bill. The filibustering Senators want government ownership of the space communication system and oppose the Administration bill for private ownership with public controls.
- July 30—Adopting an Appropriations Committee recommendation, the House rejects Kennedy's request for \$568 million for federal aid for construction of fall-out shelters.
- July 31—Anthony J. Celebrezze is sworn in as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
- The Senate filibuster on the satellite communications bill continues.
- ## Labor
- July 6—The 5 operating railway unions reject the National Mediation Board's recommendation that the work-rules controversy be submitted to arbitration.
- July 23—A threatened strike in the aerospace industry is postponed as union leaders accept Kennedy's proposal for a 3-man investigating board to study grievances.
- July 24—Eastern Air Lines rejects a settlement proposal made by Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg to end the month-long strike; the flight engineers accept the plan.
- July 26—The 5 train unions file suit in federal court to bar the railroads from adopting changes in work rules set for August 16.
- ## Military
- July 5—Cyrus Vance is sworn in as Secretary of the Army.

- July 6—The first known detonation of a hydrogen-type explosion in the U.S. is set off underground in Nevada.
- July 7—The Defense Department reports the first encouraging progress toward detecting underground nuclear explosions.
- July 9—The U.S. sets off a 2-megaton thermonuclear blast 200 miles in the atmosphere over the Pacific.
- July 16—The Pentagon opens a drive to cut the overseas dollar drain by \$900 million yearly by 1966.
- July 17—The X-15 rocket plane becomes the first winged aircraft to reach an altitude of 58.7 miles.
- July 19—The Nike Zeus missile intercepts the nose cone of an Atlas ICBM 100,000 feet over Kwajalein Island.
- July 20—Kennedy announces that General Lauris Norstad will resign as U.S. commander and head of Nato forces in Europe, effective November 1. He names Army Chief of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer to succeed him. General Maxwell Taylor, military adviser to the President, will become the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Earle Wheeler is appointed Army Chief of Staff.
- July 26—The U.S. fails in its third attempt to conduct a high-altitude nuclear test over Johnson Island. A Thor rocket and its launching pad are destroyed.
- July 31—The Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department issue a joint statement announcing tentative plans to hold high-altitude nuclear explosions after the testing deadline expires today. The continuation of the tests is due to Thor rocket failures in the high-altitude experiments.

Politics

- July 2—Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona condemns the proposed All Republican Conference and the National Republican Citizens Committee, both backed by former President Dwight Eisenhower.
- July 4—Eisenhower calls the 2 new Republican organizations "the most progressive steps our party has taken in many years."

- July 14—Abraham Ribicoff is nominated as Connecticut's Democratic candidate for the U.S. Senate.
- July 31—The Arkansas Democratic primary is held. Governor Orval E. Faubus seeks the nomination for a fifth term; U.S. Senator J. W. Fulbright runs for nomination for his fourth term.

Segregation

- July 10—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and a fellow minister are jailed in Albany, Georgia, for leading a December 16 demonstration.
- July 12—King is released from jail after his fine is paid by an unknown person.
- July 20—A federal district court judge issues a restraining order prohibiting mass demonstrations by Negroes in Albany.
- July 24—In Atlanta a federal circuit court of appeals judge declares that the district court lacked jurisdiction in the Albany city case; he sets aside the restraining order.
- July 26—A federal judge orders the reopening of the Prince Edward County, Virginia, public schools.
- July 27—King and 27 Negroes are arrested in Albany following a "prayer vigil" before the city hall. They acted to protest the city commission's refusal to discuss desegregation of Albany's public facilities.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

- July 14—Several hundred rebel Viet Cong guerrillas ambush a large convoy of government troops and kill a U.S. captain and 22 Vietnamese soldiers.
- July 16—As military operations between Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces increase, it is reported that 6 U.S. servicemen have been killed in weekend fighting.

YUGOSLAVIA

- July 23—Speaking at the close of a 2-day meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee, President Tito declares that liberalism and deviation from official ideology will no longer be tolerated in politics, economics or literature. (See also *Int'l., Int'l. Economic Conference.*)

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